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Policy Impacts 
of Investment Agreements 











This report examines the impact of certain investment agreements on government decision-
making. Primarily, it examines the impact of bilateral investment treaties (BITs) concluded 
between European Community (EC) member states and Andean Community (CAP) states. 
Additionally, it examines the impact of the investment provisions of Economic Partnership 
Agreement.2 The analysis focuses on CAP states and, in some respects, on government 
decision-making in strategic sectors. 
 
II STRATEGIC SECTORS 
 
A focus in the report is on the implications of investment agreements for government 
decision-making in strategic sectors. Strategic sectors are assumed to include (1) the resource 
sector (where it constitutes a significant source of earnings on the balance of payments), (2) 
basic infrastructure and core services including energy generation and distribution; 
transportation; water (or wastewater) treatment and distribution (or disposal); financial 
services; communication and broadcasting; and health care and education. 
 
An indication of sectors considered sufficiently important to protect from foreign ownership 
and control is offered by BITs that contain a commitment to pre-establishment national 
treatment and, by extension, exceptions to this commitment that aim to preserve the state’s 
right to ensure domestic ownership and control in certain sectors.3 Most such BITs have 
                                                 
1 LLB, MES, PhD; Assistant Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School of York University, Toronto, 
Canada; author of Investment Treaty Arbitration and Public Law (Oxford University Press, 2007). Note 
that this is a consultation report; it does not constitute legal advice or a legal opinion. The report was 
made possible by the financial assistance of Intermon Oxfam. 
2 The discussion of the impact of EPAs draws on the investment provisions of the EU-
CARIFORUM EPA text, which is the only EPA text as yet finalized by the EU and its various 
counterparts in ongoing EPA negotiations. 
3 BIT obligations of states are always post-establishment in that they apply to protect an investor 
after the investor has made an investment in the state. These include obligations to give post-
establishment national treatment, MFN treatment, fair and equitable treatment including full 
protection and security, protections against expropriation, guarantees of free capital transfers, and 
umbrella clauses (for example). In contrast, certain forms of obligations may be referred to as pre-
been concluded by either the U.S. or Canada, both having adopted the same general 
approach to their market access commitments in the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA). 
 
Thus, in BITs concluded by the U.S. or Canada with CAP states, these sectors have been 
excluded from pre-establishment and post-establishment national treatment and, in some 
instances, from most-favoured-nation treatment:4
 
• oil & gas 
• mining 
• fishing 
• air and maritime transport 
• shipping 
• banking, securities, and other financial services 
• government insurance, subsidies or grants 
• state enterprises 
• broadcasting 
• telephone services 
• social services (e.g. public law enforcement, income security, public education, health 
and child care);  
• investment screening generally. 
 
Notably, these exceptions do not apply to other BIT obligations, including fair & equitable 
treatment and limitations on expropriation (which are the provisions relied on most often by 
tribunals to find a treaty violation and order payment of damages by the state). Also, these 
sectoral exceptions in BITs concluded by the U.S. and Canada are one-sided in that the CAP 
state is not allowed the same rights to favour domestic firms as its major capital-exporting 
partner (i.e. the U.S. or Canada). In the case of nearly all BITs of this sort, the developing or 
capital-importing state is obliged to open its economy to foreign ownership and control, and 
to relinquish its right to attach conditions to foreign investment, to a much greater extent 
than is the U.S. or Canada. This non-reciprocity of this aspect of U.S. and Canadian BITs is 
discussed in more detail below. 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
establishment in that they apply to protect an investor even before it has made any investment in the 
state. The obligations of national treatment and MFN treatment may be extended to the pre-
establishment stage (in which case they may also be referred to as ‘market access’ or a ‘right of 
establishment’), typically in BITs concluded by the U.S. or Canada. Also, a prohibition on 
performance requirements also typically applies to the pre-establishment as well as the post-
establishment stage of investment. (On the other hand, an obligation to give post-establishment 
national treatment would likely include prohibitions on post-establishment performance 
requirements that treated foreign investors less favourably then domestic investors.) 
4 These sectoral exceptions are not included in BITs concluded by EU states presumably because 
such BITs do not extend national and MFN treatment to the pre-establishment stage. This precludes 
a need for EU states to protect their economies from foreign penetration and ownership in the way 
that the U.S. and Canada seek to protect their economies under their BITs that extend national and 
MFN treatment to the pre-establishment stage. 
III IMPACT OF BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES 
 
A Key BITs 
 
We begin with BITs concluded by Andean Community states. In total, CAP states had 
concluded 70 BITs in force as of 1 June 2006. Of these, Peru had concluded 28;5 Ecuador 
had concluded 23;6 and Bolivia had concluded 19.7 Colombia had concluded only one BIT 
in force (with Peru). 
 
The most significant BITs concluded by CAP states are those concluded with a major 
primary capital-exporting state.8 Because they generally cover far more capital flows than 
BITs concluded between developing states, it is these BITs that are most likely to generate 
investor claims and thus pose threats to the regulatory autonomy of the host government. 
More specifically, investments covered by these treaties are most likely to lead to disputes 
and thus put pressure on CAP states to refrain from or restrict regulatory initiatives in order 
to avoid the risk or threat of an investor claim. 
 
Table 1 indicates BITs in force between CAP states and the 16 major capital-exporters, 
where the BIT was by 1 June 2006. 
 
                                                 
5 BITs in force with Argentina, Australia, Bolivia, Chile, China, Colombia, Cuba, Czech Republic, 
Denmark, Ecuador, El Salvador, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Republic of Korea, Malaysia, 
Netherlands, Norway, Paraguay, Portugal, Romania, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, United 
Kingdom, and Venezuela. 
6 BITs in force with Argentina, Bolivia, Canada, Chile, China, Cuba, Dominican Republic, El 
Salvador, Finland, France, Germany, Guatemala, Netherlands, Paraguay, Peru, Romania, Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, and Venezuela.  
7 BITs in force with Argentina, Austria, Belgium/ Luxembourg, Chile, China, Cuba, Denmark, 
Ecuador, France, Germany, Italy, Republic of Korea, Netherlands, Peru, Romania, Sweden, 
Switzerland, United Kingdom, and United States. 
8 The ‘major capital-exporters’ listed are those states whose outward stock of foreign direct 
investment was more than $100 billion in 2004, and whose outward stock either exceeded their 
inward stock in 2004 or was exceeded by their inward stock by a ratio of less than 2 to 1: data from 
UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2005 (New York: United Nations, 2005) annex table B.2. All four 
CAP states qualify as capital-importers on the basis that their outward stock of foreign investment 
was exceeded by their inward stock by a ratio of more than 2 to 1. 
Table 1: BITs between CAP states and the major capital-exporters9
 
 
 BOLIVIA COLOMBIA ECUADOR PERU 
EC:     
BELGIUM 10-01-2004 -- -- *12-10-2005
FRANCE 12-10-1996 -- 17-06-1996 4-07-1996
GERMANY 9-11-1990 -- 12-02-1999 1-05-1997
ITALY 22-02-1992 *9-03-1994 *25-10-2001 18-10-1995
LUXEMBOURG 10-01-2004 -- -- *12-10-2005
NETHERLANDS 1-11-1994 -- 1-07-2001 1-02-1996
SPAIN 24-10-2001 2007 (assumed) 18-06-1997 17-02-1996
SWEDEN 2-07-1992 -- 31-05-2001 1-08-1994
UNITED KINGDOM 16-02-1990 *9-03-1994 24-08-1995 21-04-1994
Non-EC:  
AUSTRALIA -- -- -- 2-02-1997
CANADA -- -- 6-06-1997 20-06-2007
HONG KONG -- -- -- --
JAPAN -- -- -- --
SNGAPORE -- -- -- --
SWITZERLAND 12-05-1991 *17-05-2006 9-11-1969 23-11-1993
UNITED STATES 6-06-2001 -- 11-05-1997 --
Source: UNCTAD Investment Agreements Online (Country-specific Lists of BITs) 
 
All of the BITs of CAP states with the major capital-exporters entered into force after 1990 
with the unique exception of the Switzerland-Ecuador BIT.10 A number of the BITs11 
entered into force after the dangers posed by the investor-state arbitration mechanisms of 
BITs became apparent by the late 1990s. Notably, no BIT was in force between Colombia 
and a major capital-exporter by 1 June 2006 because BITs were regarded as unconstitutional 
in Colombia until a decision in 2007 of the Columbian Supreme Court in which that state’s 
BIT with Spain was found to be consistent with its constitution (and based on which it is 
assumed that the Spain-Colombia BIT is now in force).12
 
                                                 
9 The date entered in the chart is date of entry into force of the BIT, unless otherwise indicated. An 
asterix denotes that the treaty had not entered into force as of 1 June 2006 and that the date entered 
in the chart is that of signature of the treaty rather than entry into force. In the case of the Spain-
Colombia BIT it has been assumed that the BIT entered into force following a 2007 decision of the 
Colombian Supreme Court in which the BIT was found to be constitutional. In the case of the 
Canada-Peru BIT, it has been confirmed via non-UNCTAD sources that the BIT entered into force 
on the date indicated.  
10 The Switzerland-Ecuador BIT is likely one of the very first historically to provide for compulsory 
arbitration of investor claims on the basis of a prospective consent by the state. Also, remarkably in 
the current context, the treaty assigns ultimately appointing authority to the President of the 
International Court of Justice. More recent treaties typically assign such authority to ICSID, the 
International Chamber of Commerce, the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce, or (for claims filed 
under the UNCITRAL Rules) to an institution to be chosen by the Permanent Court of Arbitration. 
11 i.e. Bolivia’s BITs with Belgium/ Luxembourg, Spain, and the U.S.; Ecuador’s BITs with Italy, the 
Netherlands, and Sweden; and Peru’s BIT with Belgium/ Luxembourg. 
12 F. Cabrera Diaz, ‘Colombian court upholds constitutionality of BIT with Spain’ Investment Treaty 
News (15 October 2007). 
For a detailed summary of the inclusion of key provisions in Spain’s BITs with CAP states, 
see Appendix B. 
 
B Claims against Andean Community states 
 
There have been well over 100 known investor-state claims against developing states, 
brought to arbitration by a foreign investor alleging a violation of a standard of investor 
protection in an investment treaty, and seeking damages as compensation from the state. 
Approximately half are ongoing. Typically, the investor can choose whether to initiate a 
claim under the arbitration rules of the International Centre for the Settlement of 
Investment Disputes (ICSID) or the UN Commission on International Trade Law 
(UNCITRAL). Also, some BITs allow claims under to the arbitration rules of the 
International Chamber of Commerce or the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce. The choice 
of rules is significant for a number of reasons, not least because it determines the institution 
that holds the vitally important authority to appoint the presiding arbitrator, where the 
parties do not agree, and to resolve claims of bias against an arbitrator. The role of ICSID is 
especially important because, in the case of ICSID annulment tribunals, all members of the 
tribunal are selected by the Chair of the ICSID Administrative Council, which is an ex officio 
position of the President of the World Bank. 
 
There are 20 known BIT claims against CAP states (see Appendix A).13 Ecuador has faced 
15 claims, of which 10 were brought by U.S. firms (in some cases operating through holding 
companies established in the Netherlands), three were brought by Spanish firms, and one 
each was brought by a Canadian and a French firm. Ecuador has been intensively targeted 
for regulatory decisions it took in the energy sector, concerning both oil exploitation and 
electricity generation. Ecuador has faced at least seven claims arising from the government’s 
regulation of oil participation contracts, most recently in relation to the government’s effort 
to recapture a larger proportion of windfall profits earned by foreign investors as a result of 
high oil prices. Also, Ecuador has faced four claims arising from the privatization of its 
electricity network in the mid-1990s. 
 
Of the 15 claims against Ecuador, seven are ongoing. Ecuador was successful in its defence 
of two and unsuccessful in two others, leading to awards of (US)$75 million and (US)$6 
million, respectively, against the state. Three claims were settled and a fourth (Repsol, 
discussed in more detail below) has reportedly also recently settled. 
 
Bolivia has faced three claims, of which one (Aguas del Tunari) settled after intense public 
pressure was directed against the investor. Two others are ongoing. Notably, in two of these 
claims, Bolivia was targeted by a major U.S. or European firm that structured its Bolivian 
investments through a holding company established in the Netherlands so that the U.S. or 
European owners could bring a claim under the Netherlands-Bolivia BIT. This highlights the 
importance of Bolivia considering withdrawal from its BIT with the Netherlands in the 
                                                 
13 Eleven have been brought under the U.S.-Ecuador BIT, three under the Spain-Ecuador BIT, two 
under the Netherlands-Bolivia BIT, and one each under the Canada-Ecuador BIT and the France-
Ecuador BIT. All such claims were brought by investors from a major capital-exporting state against 
the CAP state party to the relevant BIT. Two other claims have been filed by Chilean investors under 
the Chile-Bolivia BIT and the Chile-Peru BIT, respectively. 
event that the Netherlands is unwilling to renegotiate the treaty’s liberal provisions on 
forum-shopping. In the third claim, Bolivia was targeted by a Chilean investor. 
 
Peru has faced two claims. Notably, both were brought by an investor not from a major 
capital-exporting state (i.e. from Chile and China, respectively). Peru was successful in its 
argument that the first claim related to a dispute that preceded Peru’s consent to compulsory 
investor-state arbitration in the relevant BIT, and thus fell outside the temporal jurisdiction 
of the tribunal. The other claim against Peru is ongoing. 
 
Unsurprisingly, given the constitutional position on BITs adopted by its Supreme Court until 
2007, Colombia is not known to have faced any claims.  
 
Prevalence of claims in strategic sectors 
 
Of the 20 claims against CAP states, most have involved governmental decisions in strategic 
sectors. In the case of Bolivia, the Aguas del Tunari claim implicated conduct of the 
government (including its use and potential use of coercive force against citizens) in relation 
to public opposition to rate hikes that followed the privatization of the water/ wastewater 
system of the city of Cochabamba. The dispute engaged basic questions of accessibility and 
affordability in relation to an essential service and the corresponding implications of market-
based approaches to service delivery. One of the two known ongoing claims against Bolivia, 
Euro Telecom, involves a policy decision of national importance to renationalize the country’s 
telephone network (prior to which the affected foreign investor held majority ownership of 
the company delivering 60% of the country’s telephone services). The other ongoing claim 
involves a mining concession. All claims against Bolivia may therefore credibly be said to 
arise in strategic sectors. 
 
In the case of Ecuador, as mentioned, seven claims have involved oil and gas exploitation 
and four have involved the provision of electricity (generally in conditions of severe supply 
shortage and corresponding emergency in the country). There is less information available 
on the four remaining claims; one involved the provision of information technology services 
to the Ministry of Finance and Public Credit, another involved a dispute over crude oil sales, 
and two others involved a dispute over the expansion of a refinery. The latter three may 
therefore be linked to the strategic sector of resource extraction. 
 
Finally, the two known claims against Peru involved a pasta factory (sited near a protected 
wetland) and a fish flour factor. Neither of these can be said to represent strategic sectors 
although they may hold significance for industrial policy. 
 
Thus, of the 20 known claims, 11 involved the resource sector (oil in gas; mining), four 
involved electricity generation, and one each involved a major water/ wastewater system and 
the nationwide telephone system, respectively. Three claims involved non-strategic sectors. 
This indicates that it is likely that a dispute arising under a BIT will engage a strategic sector 
of the host economy. Moreover, there are numerous other claims or awards, beyond the 
scope of this report, that involve developing states and that engage the strategic interests of 
those states and their populations in relation to resource extraction, energy, communications, 
transportation, major water systems, and the financial and monetary system. 
 
C Awards against Andean Community states 
 
To date, there have been at least 30 known awards of damages in favour of investors under 
investment treaties (including both BITs and regional investment agreements such as 
NAFTA). One award was against Spain (in favour of an Argentinian investor for the 
smallest sum of any known award), one was against Russia (in favour of a German investor), 
and two were against Canada (in favour of U.S. investors). The remaining awards have been 
against developing or transition states. Amounts awarded have ranged from several hundred 
thousand dollars (U.S.) to over one billion dollars. 
 
Of the 30 awards to date, three have been for less than $1 million, thirteen for between $1 
million and $10 million, four for between $10 million and $50 million, and nine for over $50 
million (up to the award of $1.05 billion including interest in a case against Slovakia14). 
 
Most significant are the large or ‘catastrophic’ awards for over $50 million. The significance 
of these awards is that they signal to all states the exceptionally potent power of the system 
to discipline states and their populations. Exposure to investor-state arbitration thus impacts 
not only the fiscal position of a government but also its ability to plan and cost out any 
policy that could affect adversely the economic position of a foreign investor. Any such 
policy could trigger a claim and an award against the state and, as such, all states that have 
concluded a BIT and that import capital are impacted by the dramatic shift of political 
bargaining power delivered by BITs in favour of multinational firms. 
 
There have been only two awards to date against a CAP state (both against Ecuador – see 
Appendix A) although more are likely to follow from ongoing claims, of which there are at 
least ten against CAP states. The small number of awards is perhaps surprising given that 
more awards have been made against Latin American states than any other region. On the 
other hand, Ecuador has been the target of numerous awards and is likely to face more 
awards or costly settlements. Further, both Ecuador and Bolivia have had to modify policy 
decisions in the course of a dispute with an investor who brought a BIT claim.15 Finally, it is 
important to keep in mind that the cost of defending a claim – for many states involving the 
hiring of expensive law firms in New York, London, Paris, or other major centres – poses a 
fiscal burden in its own right for a developing state. For example, the present author was 
advised by one legal advisor to the president of a large developing state that the cost of 
defending a single treaty claim had consumed roughly half of the entire 2005 budget of the 
country’s department of justice. In the extreme, the Czech Republic reportedly spent $10 
million to defend itself against two claims brought by a U.S. investor.16
 
                                                 
14 Ceskoslovenska Obchodni Banka v Slovak Republic (award on jurisdiction, 24 May 1999). Note that the 
tribunal based its jurisdiction in this award on the incorporation into a contract of the compulsory 
arbitration clause in a BIT which the claimant had not shown to be in force. As the origin of the 
respondent state’s consent is connected to a BIT, I include it as a BIT claim. 
15 BIT claims were settled by Bolivia in Aguas del Tunari and by Ecuador in IBM, Eurocontrol, Tecnicas 
Reunidas, and (reportedly) Repsol. 
16 UNCTAD, ‘Recent developments in international investment agreements’ (Research note, 30 
August 2005), p. 15. 
The most significant award to date against a CAP states is that of approximately US$75 
million against Ecuador in Occidental No. 1 in a dispute involving eligibility for Value-Added 
Tax (VAT) refunds (for the factual background of this dispute, see Appendix A).17 The most 
troubling aspect of this is the fact that the tribunal adopted a series of surprisingly expansive 
interpretations of the U.S.-Ecuador BIT to favour the position of the investor. In this 
respect, the award lacks credibility. In the first place, the tribunal adopted an apparently 
contradictory position on whether or not the underlying dispute arose from a contract. The 
tribunal concluded, on the one hand, that Occidental’s claim arose under the BIT (as distinct 
from claims arising under Occidental’s oil contract with Petroecuador), with the implication 
that the BIT’s ‘fork in the road’ provision did not preclude Occidental from bringing a BIT 
claim despite Occidental’s pursuit of domestic remedies under the contract. On the other 
hand, the tribunal concluded that the dispute concerned ‘the observance and enforcement’ 
of an investment contract, with the implication that the BIT’s exception for tax measures did 
not apply to Ecuador’s decision to deny VAT refunds to Occidental Petroleum. Thus, the 
tribunal approached the dispute both as one that arose only under the treaty and as one 
relating to a contract, in both respects to resolve issues in dispute in favour of the investor 
and thus facilitate the claim. 
 
Also troubling, on its decision on the merits, the tribunal adopted an expansive reading of 
various standards of investor protection (discussed in more detail below) in the BIT, 
including the concepts of arbitrariness, national treatment, and fair & equitable treatment, in 
order to find that Ecuador violated the treaty. Regarding ‘arbitrariness’, the tribunal 
concluded that, even though Ecuador’s conduct (via its Servicio de Rentas Internas – SRI) 
had not been motivated by ‘prejudice or preference’ but was rather based on ‘reason and 
fact’. Nevertheless, the tribunal concluded based on a very loose framing of the standard, the 
‘very confusion and lack of clarity’ arising from the SRI’s practices ‘resulted in some form of 
arbitrariness, even if not intended’. 
 
Regarding ‘national treatment’, the tribunal resorted to the BIT’s most-favoured-nation 
obligation in order to remove the usual requirement that national treatment is only required 
where foreign and domestic investors are ‘in like circumstances’. Instead, the tribunal found 
that national treatment was not limited to a comparison of domestic and foreign investors 
who were in like circumstances, and that it required Ecuador to provide the same treatment 
on VAT refunds to oil ‘producers’ (such as OEPC) as it did to ‘exporters’ of e.g. flowers 
(which unlike ‘producers’ were eligible for VAT refunds under Ecuadorian law). In addition, 
the tribunal concluded that, although the SRI did not intend to discriminate against OEPC 
or foreign-owned firms, the less favourable effects of the SRI’s decision were sufficient to 
violate national treatment. 
 
Lastly, the tribunal also adopted a broad reading of ‘fair & equitable treatment’. It adopted 
the expansive (and controversial) approach of certain earlier tribunals by obliging Ecuador to 
‘ensure a transparent and predictable framework for [investors’] business planning and 
investment’ and to ‘act in a consistent manner, free from ambiguity and totally transparently 
in its relations with the foreign investor’. Yet further, the Occidental No. 1 tribunal concluded 
that the state’s duty of transparency and predictability ‘is an objective requirement that does 
not depend on whether the Respondent [state] has proceeded in good faith or not’. Also, 
                                                 
17 Occidental Exploration and Production Company v Republic of Ecuador (award on the merits, 1 July 2004). 
with very little discussion and with no reference whatsoever to outside legal authorities, the 
tribunal concluded that its very broad reading of fair & equitable treatment ‘is not different 
from that required under [customary] international law’. This contradicted not only the 
arguments of Ecuador but also those of other states, including the U.s. and Canada, in other 
investment treaty arbitrations. Thus, the tribunal turned the words ‘fair and equitable’ into a 
very onerous standard, almost assuredly surpassing that which would apply to governmental 
activities in the investor’s home state under U.S. law. In subjecting capital-important states to 
this intrusive standard, especially in combination with the remedy of a damages award 
against the state, tribunals apply much more intensive constraints on the regulatory decisions 
in developing states than apply to governments in North America and Europe under their 
domestic law. 
 
On these several issues, the tribunal in Occidental No. 2 adopted expansive readings of the 
BIT, found a violation by Ecuador, and issued a substantial award in favour of Occidental. 
Notably, a related BIT arbitration is ongoing in Occidental No. 2, where the same claimant 
seeks more than one billion dollars in compensation. It remains to be seen whether the 
members of the tribunal in Occidental No. 2 will adopt as expansive an approach in favour of 
the investor as did the tribunal in Occidental No. 1 (for a list of tribunal members in both 
cases, see Appendix A). 
 
IV IMPLICATIONS FOR GOVERNMENT DECISION-MAKING 
 
Bilateral investment treaties have three key elements. First, they apply broadly to virtually any 
regulatory activity that affects assets of a foreign investor. Second, they lay out broadly-
framed standards (open to varying interpretations by tribunals, as in Occidental No. 1) in order 
to protect investors from regulatory activity, even where the activity is a general measure that 
does not specifically isolate or target a particular foreign investor or groups of foreign 
investors. Third, via the use of investor-state arbitration, they provide for the most 
aggressive and intrusive form of treaty-based dispute settlement and award enforcement ever 
established in the regulatory sphere. We begin with the significance of this third element – 
which combines compulsory arbitration with state liability in the regulatory sphere, even for 
legislative decisions – before turning to the scope and standards of investor protection under 
investment treaties. 
 
A The dynamic of state liability 
 
Investment treaty arbitration is a uniquely powerful method to regulate and discipline states 
because it (a) allows direct claims by investors, often without the customary requirement to 
exhaust legal remedies in the host state, (b) allows for an internationally-enforceable damages 
award against the state for virtually any regulatory act, including legislation, and (c) relies on 
private arbitration to resolve public law disputes in a manner that is structurally biased 
against host governments. More specifically, in terms of this structural bias, BITs allow 
privately appointed arbitrators (rather than tenured judges) to resolve regulatory disputes 
between business and the state, and to determine the available policy space of host 
governments, in a context where only one class of parties (investors) brings the claims – 
giving arbitrators an incentive to interpret the law in favour of that class of parties in order 
to encourage more claims and more appointments – and where the ultimate authority to 
appoint arbitrators is exercised by organizations whose voting structure is controlled by 
representatives of either multinational firms or capital-exporting states (speaking of the 
International Chamber of Commerce and ICSID, respectively). Further, awards made by 
tribunals cannot be reviewed for errors of law (other than jurisdictional errors or serious 
procedural unfairness) in any domestic court. Lastly, in many cases, the relevant rules of 
arbitration provides for the arbitrations and any awards to be kept secret unless both of the 
disputing parties agree otherwise. 
 
Notably, BITs provide for investors to bring claims against states as a means to discipline 
states in their treatment of investors. BITs do not provide for states to bring claims against 
investors for activities of investors that harm the public. In this respect, investor-state 
arbitration is one-sided in that only one class of parties, the investors, brings the claims and 
only one class of parties, the states, is ordered to pay damages for violation of the treaty. The 
only (very minor) exception to this is the possibility that a state might bring a counter-claim 
against an investor for breach of an obligation of the investor to the state (probably arising 
under a contract that is brought within the rubric of the BIT by an umbrella clause). But 
even in the case of a counter-claim by the state, it is the investor who decides first to bring 
the dispute into the arbitration forum, thus triggering appointment of the tribunal. It is for 
this reason, among others, that BIT arbitrators may be seen to have a bias in favour of 
investors: if arbitrators do not interpret BITs in ways that favour claims by investors (while 
retaining the basic legitimacy for the system) then there will be fewer claims by investors and 
less business for the arbitration industry. 
 
At the centre of the disciplinary power of BIT arbitration is the remedy of a damages award 
against the state (involving ‘state liability’ for sovereign acts of the state). These awards of 
damages are very different from a typical  damages award in private or commercial law. They 
may be issued by arbitrators in order to discipline the legislature, courts, or executive of a 
state. This is important because it is rare in many states to allow state liability for legislative 
or judicial acts, and for general policy or discretionary decisions of the executive, in the case 
of conduct of the state that is found retrospectively to be unlawful. Such liability for the state 
raises concerns as to its fiscal impacts and potential to deter legitimate regulatory measures 
that would otherwise be passed in the public interest. Very importantly, outside investment 
treaty arbitration, it is unheard of to allow such questions to be resolved finally by way of 
compulsory arbitration (with comprehensive jurisdiction over future disputes), rather than 
courts, because of the perceived bias that arises from the lack of objective guarantees of 
independence in arbitration, especially (a) the lack of security of tenure and (b) the failure to 
stop arbitrators from taking up outside remunerative activity alongside their adjudicative 
work. 
 
In many cases, awards under BITs arise from general regulatory measures that affect foreign 
investors only indirectly and in ways that were not planned or intended by the host state. 
Also, it is reasonable to conclude that many awards have been founded on interpretations of 
BITs that were more expansive than what was anticipated by states when the treaties were 
negotiated. The prospect of tribunals adopting expansive approaches to BITs, as in many 
cases to date, exacerbates other key implications of state liability. First, states face the cost of 
defending themselves against claims where the relevant law is uncertain or where it has been 
subject to conflicting interpretations by past tribunals. As noted above, these costs can be 
severe. Also, in the context of this uncertainty, the state may face greater pressure to settle a 
case than would be the case if the law was reasonably clear. In the words of one U.S. lawyer, 
the ability to sue under an investment treaty is:18
 
‘an open invitation to unhappy investors, tempted to complain that a financial or 
business failure was due to improper regulation, misguided macroeconomic policy, 
or discriminatory treatment by the host government and delighted by the 
opportunity to threaten the national government with a tedious expensive 
arbitration.’  
 
Second, states face the cost of damages awards. To date, as mentioned, there are 30 known 
awards against states under investment treaties, usually against mid-sized developing states. 
The majority of awards were for less than $10 million (although even an award of a few 
million dollars can be significant for a smaller state). However, at least nine awards were for 
more than $50 million. These awards send a message to all states that virtually any regulatory 
measure, where it affects the assets of an investor in a significant way, could devastate the 
state’s fiscal situation. 
 
Third, the threat of a claim and an award may cause the state to abandon legitimate measures 
that it would otherwise pursue in the public interest. For example, in the case of Ethyl19 
under the investment chapter of NAFTA, the Canadian government had banned a gasoline 
additive that was manufactured by a U.S. firm. The ban was justified on environmental and 
public health grounds, including scientific opinion that inhalation of its fumes could damage 
the nervous system of children. The additive had been banned in California since the 1970s. 
In response, the U.S. firm brought a NAFTA arbitration claim against Canada, arguing that 
the ban was an expropriation without the required compensation. After the tribunal decided 
that it had jurisdiction over the claim, Canada settled. In the settlement, Canada agreed to 
remove the ban, declare publicly that the gasoline additive was not an environmental or a 
health risk, and pay $19 million in compensation to the U.S. firm.20
 
Unlike where a state consents to arbitration in a contract, a BIT consent to arbitration opens 
the door to any investor, including investors unknown to the host government, initiating an 
arbitration in relation to virtually any regulatory dispute. The state thus loses its relative 
ability (under a contract) to predict and manage its liabilities arising from consents to 
arbitration. Arbitrators are in turn given wide-ranging, comprehensive jurisdiction, and 
                                                 
18 W. Rogers, ‘Emergence of the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) 
as the Most Significant Forum for Submission of Bilateral Investment Treaty Disputes’ (Presentation 
to the Inter-American Development Bank Conference, 26-7 October 2000). 
19 Ethyl Corporation v Government of Canada (award on jurisdiction, 24 June 1998). 
20 Likewise, the Canadian government’s abandoned a proposal to require cigarette manufactures to 
remove descriptive terms from cigarette packages and use plain packaging only following a threat by 
cigarette manufacturer Philip Morris to bring a NAFTA claim on the basis that Canada’s proposed 
regulation would be ‘unfair and inequitable’ and would ‘expropriate and destroy the affected 
trademarks and brands in Canada as well as the substantial goodwill that accompanies them in 
violation of both NAFTA and TRIPS’. Thus, the threat of an investment treaty claim may have 
contributed to a government’s decision not to pursue a public health measure that was aimed at the 
legitimate objective of deterring consumption of an addictive poison. See ‘Submission by Philip 
Morris International Inc. in Response to the National Center for Standards and Certification 
Information Foreign Trade Notification No. G/TBT/N/CAN/22’. 
tremendous power to evaluate and discipline states in relation to their past decision-making, 
including choices of elected legislatures, general governmental policies, and final decisions of 
the courts. This makes it difficult for states to govern in the public interest wherever there is 
a risk of offending the business priorities of a foreign investor. 
 
In the context of the EC, a concern has been expressed by governments where the 
European Court of Justice applies its so-called Francovich doctrine to award damages in 
favour of an individual who has suffered harm due to a breach of EC law by a member state. 
According to the Danish and U.K. governments, as well as the EC Commission:21
 
‘If questions of interpretation are shrouded in uncertainty and a Member State 
exercises discretion in a reasonable way, it would seem unreasonable for it to incur 
liability if it is later held that Community law precludes the national law or 
administrative practice in question. Unblameworthy legal mistakes should not lead to 
liability to make reparation.’ 
 
The very same concern arises in relation to state liability and compulsory arbitration under 
investment treaties. 
 
On the other hand, it important to point out that a host state does not lose all of its options 
in the face of a BIT claim, even if its options are much reduced by a consent to investor-
state arbitration. States retain the opportunity to negotiate for settlement, with the state’s 
bargaining position tending to reflect the context in which the dispute arose and, especially, 
the investor’s degree of interest in maintaining good relations with the host government or 
avoiding adverse publicity arising from a claim. Investors will themselves wish to avoid the 
cost of an arbitration, especially where the investor is not a major firm and where it is 
evident that the state will fight it out in an extended litigation. Perhaps most importantly, the 
ability of investors to collect on awards is not beyond question. States may opt to refuse to 
pay on various grounds such as violation of domestic law or the unfairness of the award or 
arbitration process. In such cases, investors would have to chase assets of the state in the 
territory of other states, pursuant to the relevant arbitration treaties allowing for extra-
territorial enforcement, subject to uncertainties about the value, location, and vulnerability to 
enforcement of a state’s assets abroad. States threatened with or involved in an investment 
treaty claim are thus well advised to take cognizance of their assets abroad and ensure that 
they are not exposed in foreign states (e.g. France) whose domestic law adopts a liberal 
approach to the enforcement of foreign awards. 
 
Fiscal reforms in the extractive sector 
 
The following expands on the implications of state liability under BITs in relation to fiscal 
reforms in the extractive (or resource) sector. A fiscal reform in this sector would almost 
certainly be covered by a relevant BIT (i.e. one to which an affected investor had access), 
given the broad definition of the term ‘measure’ in BITs (see below). Thus, such fiscal 
reforms would likely be subject to BIT arbitration and disciplines. Any BIT would be 
‘applicable’ to such reform where the affected investor could demonstrate that it was an 
                                                 
21 Brasserie du Pecheur SA v Germany, Secretary of State for Transport, ex parte Factortame Ltd and Others (No 
46 & 48/93), Report for the Hearing, [1996] ECR-I-1034, para 57.  
investor of the other state party to the BIT, including by resort to liberal provisions on 
forum-shopping (typically contained in BITs concluded by the Netherlands, the U.K., the 
U.S., Canada, and Switzerland; typically not contained in BITs concluded by Germany, 
France, Belgium, and Spain). Such forum-shopping provisions allow an investor to obtain 
very easily the nationality of a state party to the treaty (and thus gain access to its arbitration 
mechanism) simply by establishing a holding company in the state’s territory. In a number of 
arbitrations against CAP states (especially under BITs with the Netherlands), the ‘investor’ 
was merely a holding company that was in fact owned by investors from a third state. 
 
Notably, tax measures have been the subject of a number of claims by investors, including 
against CAP states. For example, in Occidental No. 1, the decision of Ecuador’s Servicio de 
Rentas Internas to deny VAT refunds to oil companies on the basis that ‘producers’ in the 
oil sector did not qualify as ‘exporters’ under the relevant law and policy (which the tribunal 
concluded was applied by the SRI in good faith and without an effort to prejudice foreign-
owned companies or preference domestic investors). Also, in Occidental No. 2, the target of 
the investor’s claim has been an effort by Ecuador to renegotiate or terminate investment 
contracts in the oil sector on the grounds that the investor breached the terms of the 
contract or that the existing terms, in changing market conditions, did not deliver sufficient 
benefits to the host state.22
 
Importantly, as discussed above, even where a state acts in good faith as in Occidental No. 1 
(and elsewhere), arbitrators have awarded damages against the state by holding that mere 
uncertainty or confusion arising from the state’s decisions were ‘arbitrary’, because the 
effects (though not the intentions) of the state’s decisions were ‘discriminatory’, and because 
of the state was said to have an ‘objective responsibility’ to ensure fair treatment for foreign 
investors. 
 
On the other hand, fiscal reforms would not be subject to a BIT if they were tax measures 
that fell within the meaning of an exception for such measures in the BIT. Typically, BITs 
concluded by the U.S. or Canada contain express exceptions for tax measures. That said, the 
exceptions may be limited in various ways, as demonstrated in Occidental No. 1, where 
Ecuador’s denial of VAT refunds was found not to fall within the BIT’s tax exception 
because the dispute with Occidental involved aspects of an investment contract with 
Petroecuador. It is therefore important to read any BIT exception carefully to determine its 
scope and conditions of application (and its level of uncertainty). Moreover, exceptions are, 
like other BIT provisions, often ambiguous and, as such, open to interpretation by tribunals 
so as to favour the investor. (Indeed, in some cases, arbitrators have concluded 
controversially that ambiguity in an investment treaty should be interpreted in favour of the 
investor interest because the purpose of investment treaties is to protect investors.23)  
 
More broadly, in terms of the wider dynamic of state liability, any public program or service 
that requires expenditure of public funds – whether for infrastructure, health or education 
                                                 
22 For a detailed discussion of Repsol’s participation contract in Ecuador’s Bloque 16 oil field, and 
components of the contract that involve apparent under-investment by the investor and transfers of 
costs to the state, see H. Llanes Suárez, OXY – Contratos Petroleros – Inequidad en la distribución de la 
producción (Quito: 2006) p. 158-192. 
23 e.g. SGS Société Générale de Surveillance v Pakistan (award on jurisdiction, 6 August 2003), para 116. 
services, public security, administration of justice, arts and culture, regional development, 
and so on – will be impacted by BITs in two inter-related ways. First, the general budget may 
be severely impacted by awards and by the cost of defending claims. Second, uncertainties 
regarding the prospects of a claim or an award against the state in response to a proposed 
fiscal reform may deter the state from pursuing the reform. This was discussed in relation to 
the Ethyl case above. Ethyl did not involve a fiscal reform in the extractive sector, of course. 
Nevertheless, the case demonstrates the pressure that can be brought to bear by 
multinational firms, using an investment treaty, against even a major developed state. 
 
Given that resource extraction is centrally important to the governments of all the CAP 
states, and that it makes up a significant proportion of state revenues, it is predictable that 
long-term contracts in that sector will periodically be subject to renegotiation pressures as 
market conditions evolve. Indeed, it may be irresponsible for a state to stand back and not 
seek a fairer share of extraordinary profits flowing to private firms where the price of a 
commodity has risen rapidly and unexpectedly on international markets (just as a private 
firm can be expected to seek renegotiation of long-term contracts where prices collapse). 
Such efforts may be viewed as a part of the state’s responsibility to ensure that the value of 
its extractive sector delivers commensurate benefits to its economy and population, 
including by way of the state’s tax and spending policies. 
 
B The wide coverage of BITs 
 
BITs apply to virtually any regulatory activity because they typically define key terms such as 
‘investor’, ‘investment’, and state ‘measures’ in broad terms. The implications of this are 
discussed below. 
 
Democratic choice, governmental flexibility, and the definition of ‘state measures’ 
 
BITs apply presumptively to any measure of the state. In some cases, this is specified to 
include, for example, ‘any law, regulation, procedure, requirement, or practice’ under the 
Canada-Peru BIT.24 In other cases, the definition of measure is not laid out specifically but 
would almost be regarded by tribunals to include any act of the state. In either case, the 
treaties apply to virtually any measure of any branch or level of government. This is critical 
because it means that BIT obligations and liabilities apply not only to government acts that 
target or abuse specific investors, but also to general discretionary or policy choices of the 
executive, to final decisions of the judiciary, and to general legislative measures, including 
measures that are consistent with or even mandated by the domestic constitution. The 
fettering of democratic choice and regulatory flexibility is in turn given force by the 
exceptional power of the remedy, a damages award that is internationally-enforceable under 
the terms of arbitration treaties including the ICSID Convention, the New York Convention, and 
the Panama Convention. 
 
                                                 
24 Agreement Between Canada and the Republic of Peru for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, Art. 1 – 
definition of ‘measure’ (signed but not in force as of 1 June 2006). 
Regulatory activity and the definition of ‘investment’ 
 
The definition of ‘investment’ in BITs is also typically broad, such that it extends beyond 
tangible assets to include such intangibles as market share, goodwill, intellectual property 
rights, or ‘any asset’. The definition of investment in the U.S.-Ecuador BIT is indicative:25
 
‘ “investment” means every kind of investment in the territory of one Party owned 
or controlled directly or indirectly by nationals or companies of the other Party, such 
as equity, debt, and service and investment contracts; and includes: (i) tangible and 
intangible property...; (ii) a company or shares of stock or other interests in a 
company...; (iii) a claim to money or a claim to performance having economic value, 
and associated with an investment; (iv) intellectual property...; and (v) any right 
conferred by law or contract, and any licenses and permits pursuant to law;’ 
 
Similarly, the Netherlands-Peru BIT provides:26
 
‘the term “investments” shall comprise every kind of asset and more particularly, 
though not exclusively: (i) movable and immovable property as well as any other 
rights in rem in respect of every kind of asset; (ii) rights derived from shares, bonds 
and other kinds of interests in companies and joint ventures; (iii) title to money and 
other assets and to any performance having an economic value; (iv) intellectual and 
industrial property rights...; (v) rights granted under public law, including rights to 
prospect, explore, extract and win natural resources.’ 
 
The breadth of the term ‘investment’ in investment treaties means that disciplines placed on 
states will often overlap with disciplines arising from agreements on trade in goods (given 
that investments may be linked to the production of goods for export or import), trade in 
services (given that services may be supplied by the business establishment or ‘commercial 
presence’ of a service supplier), or intellectual property rights (themselves typically included 
in the definition of investment). 
 
As a result of this wide coverage, the obligations of a CAP state under a BIT will typically 
apply to virtually any governmental act that is carried out by any branch or level of the state 
unless the act is expressly exempt from the treaty. Where a state is unaware of the degree of 
foreign ownership and BIT coverage in a particular industry or sector, therefore, it should 
assume out of caution that BIT liabilities could arise from regulatory measures in that 
industry or sector. 
 
Even so, to found an actual claim under a BIT, the assets at stake would need to be of 
sufficient value to justify the cost of bringing a claim. This cost can be prohibitive for 
investors (just as the cost of defending claims is very burdensome for states). Moreover, an 
investor – before bringing a claim – must consider its wider interest in not jeopardizing its 
relationship with the host government. In light of these considerations, a state should be 
                                                 
25 Treaty between the United States of America and the Republic of Ecuador concerning the Encouragement and 
Reciprocal Protection of Investment, Art. I(1)(a). 
26 Agreement on encouragement and reciprocal protection of investments between the Kingdom of the Netherlands and 
the Republic of Peru, Art. 1(a). 
attentive to its BIT liabilities but not unduly intimidated. States have bargaining options too, 
typically reflecting the size and importance of its market or resource sector for foreign 
investors and their preparedness to refuse to pay an award. 
 
Forum-shopping and the definition of ‘investor’ 
 
Under investment treaties, an ‘investor’ typically includes not only natural persons or 
corporations that are owned directly by natural persons of a state party to the treaty, but also 
mere holding companies that are established formally in the other state party to the treaty, 
but are actually owned and controlled by investors of a third state. Thus, the Netherlands-
Bolivia BIT contains this provision to allow forum-shopping (as in Occidental No. 1) under 
the BIT via the establishment of holding companies:27 ‘the term “nationals” [i.e. ‘investor’] 
shall comprise with regard to either Contracting Party: ... (ii) ... legal persons constituted in 
accordance with the law of that Contracting Party.’  
 
Based on such provisions, many BITs adopt a liberal approach to forum-shopping such that 
a state – in the face of these BITs – must assume that any foreign investor in its economy 
may be able to access compulsory arbitration under an investment treaty even where the 
host state does not have a BIT with the state or origin of the foreign investor itself. A liberal 
approach to forum-shopping, adopted not only in the treaties but also in the interpretations 
of BITs by numerous tribunals – invites foreign investors to design their corporate structure 
in order to maximize their opportunities to bring a BIT claim against the state in which their 
assets are located. 
 
Thus, in the Aguas del Tunari claim against Bolivia,28 the U.S. firm Bechtel – after it became 
apparent that there was public opposition to its privatized water utility in Cochabamba – 
reorganized its corporate structure so as to insert three Dutch holding companies in the 
corporate structure between Bechtel itself and the Cayman Islands firm (later moved to 
Luxembourg at the time the Dutch holding companies were established) that owned the 
Bolivian firm Aguas del Tunari (which was the firm that was a party to the Cochabamba 
water concession). Tracing this chain of ownership, the actual majority shareholder of Aguas 
del Tunari (and of the concession) was a U.S. firm that had no access to a U.S.-Bolivia BIT 
(because none was in force at the time). However, the broad definition of ‘investor’ in the 
Netherlands-Bolivia BIT allowed Bechtel effectively to re-create itself as a Dutch investor, 
by way of Dutch holding companies, and to bring a claim against Bolivia under the 
Netherlands-Bolivia BIT. 
 
So, investment treaties often protect far more than actual capital flows between states parties 
to the treaty. Actual flows may not correspond to the legal arrangements for ownership of 
assets. Investors can make themselves foreign by a paper transfer of assets among various 
companies without any commitment to invest new capital to the host economy. This was so 
                                                 
27 Agreement on encouragement and reciprocal protection of investments between the Kingdom of the Netherlands and 
the Republic of Bolivia, Art. . 
28 Aguas del Tunari SA v Republic of Bolivia (award on jurisdiction, 21 October 2005), para 69, 73, and 
237, and para 4 and 10 (dissenting opinion). 
in Aguas del Tunari, but also in the Fedax arbitration,29 where the tribunal allowed a Dutch 
company to bring a BIT claim against Venezuela in a dispute concerning promissory notes 
issued by the Venezuelan government. Prior to the claim, the promissory notes had been 
transferred to the Dutch company by a Venezuelan firm. Venezuela’s argument that the 
investor had not made an actual investment in the country’s economy was, however, 
rejected. 
 
C The standards of investor protection 
 
BITs lay out broadly-framed standards by which the conduct of host states for investment is 
to be evaluated in the arbitration of an investor claim. The standards typically include (most 
prominently): national treatment (denial of which is often called ‘discriminatory’ treatment), 
most-favoured nation (MFN) treatment, fair & equitable treatment (including for present 
purposes ‘full protection and security’), limitations on expropriation (or ‘deprivation’), 
specific prohibitions on performance requirements (both pre- and post-establishment), and 
duties to observe obligations to investors (also called ‘umbrella clauses’). Each of these is 
discussed below. 
 
In the 30 awards against states to date, a tribunal based its finding that the state violated the 
relevant treaty on fair and equitable treatment in 23 cases (in one case, this was via an MFN 
clause in the treaty), limitations on expropriation in ten cases, national treatment in seven 
cases, an umbrella clause in five cases, and prohibitions on performance requirements in one 




Although the language used in the treaties may vary, generally speaking ‘national treatment’ 
requires a host state to treat foreign investors from the other state party ‘no less favourably’ 
than it treats domestic persons or firms who are in similar circumstances (although it may 
treat foreign investors more favourable, as in the provision of tax holidays or exemptions 
from regulatory requirements). To demonstrate, under the U.S.-Ecuador BIT:30
 
‘Each Party shall permit and treat investment, and activities associated therewith, on 
a basis no less favourable than that accorded in like situations to investment or 
associated activities of its own nationals or companies....’ 
 
And, according to the Spain-Colombia BIT:31
 
‘Cada Parte Contratante... no obstaculizará, mediante medidas injustificadas o 
discriminatorias, la gestión, el mantenimiento, el desarrollo, la utilización, el disfrute, 
la extensión, la venta ni, en su caso, la liquidación de tales inversiones.’ 
                                                 
29 Fedax NV v Republic of Venezuela (award on jurisdiction, 11 July 1997), para 18 and 24-25.  
30 Treaty between the United States of America and the Republic of Ecuador concerning the Encouragement and 
Reciprocal Protection of Investment, Art. II(1). 
31 Acuerdo para la promoción y protección recíproca de inversiones entre la República de Colombia y el Reino de 
España, Art. 3 (not in force as of June 2006). 
 
State measures that favour domestic firms or employees are commonly said to be 
‘discriminatory’ against foreign investors.  
 
National treatment generally applies to the post-establishment stage of an investment, but 
may be extended to the ‘pre-establishment’ stage. Where a treaty extends national treatment 
to the pre-establishment stage, any restrictions on foreign ownership and control of the 
economy – including its strategic sectors – are also forbidden (unless the treaty specifically 
exempts them from the pre-establishment obligation). Pre-establishment national treatment 
is also often referred to as ‘market access’ or as a ‘right of establishment’. Under an absolute 
rule of pre-establishment national treatment, a state would be required to allow 100 percent 
foreign access and ownership in every sector of its economy. 
 
For this reason, states include positive exceptions to pre-establishment national treatment. 
Exceptions adopted by states parties to BITs between CAP states and the U.S. or Canada 
were discussed briefly above. Table 2 offers more detail on such exceptions in relevant BITs. 
 
Table 2: Exceptions to national/ MFN treatment in U.S. or Canadian BITs with CAP states
 
State (BIT) Exceptions from national treatment and/or MFN treatment 
Bolivia (U.S.-Bolivia) land ownership within 50 kilometers of national borders, in so far as 
required by Article 25 of the Constitution; air transport; transportation 
on interior navigable waterways; ownership of international passenger 
and freight land transportation companies; subsidies or grants, 
including government-supported loans, guarantees and insurance; 
obligation of foreign construction and consulting companies 
participating in public sector tenders to associate with a Bolivian 
company; and leasing of minerals and pipeline rights of way on 
government lands, regarding which national treatment is subject to 
limitations set forth in Article 25 of the Constitution. 
Columbia (NA) 
 
No BITs concluded with the U.S. or Canada. 
Ecuador (Canada-Ecuador) land ownership within 50 kilometres of the national borders, and 
within territories designated as reserved areas such as national parks. 
Ecuador (U.S.-Ecuador) traditional fishing (not including fish processing or aquaculture); and 
ownership and operation of broadcast radio and television stations. 
Canada (Canada-Ecuador)  social services (i.e. public law enforcement; correctional services; 
income security or insurance; social security or insurance; social 
welfare; public education; public training; health and child care); 
services in any other sector; government securities; residency 
requirements for ownership of oceanfront land; measures 
implementing the Northwest Territories and the Yukon Oil and Gas 
Accords. 
Canada (Canada-Peru)  
 
acquisitions of Canadian businesses subject to the Investment Canada 
Act; commercial air transport; duty-free licences at land border 
crossings; examiners of cultural property; fishing licensing; licensed 
custom brokerages; limitations on interests in controlled land; 
limitations on ownership of uranium mining property; oil and gas 
production and development; the Hibernia Project; ownership of an 
existing state enterprise or governmental entity; Canadian ownership 
requirements of federally incorporated corporations; requirement that 
25 per cent of directors of federally-incorporated corporations be 
resident Canadians; limitations on voting shares held in Air Canada, 
Cameco Limited, Nordion International Inc., Theratronics 
International Limited, and Canadian Arsenals Limited; Patent Office 
and Trade-Mark Office representation; pilotage services; ship 
registration. 
United States (U.S.-Bolivia):  
 
air and maritime transport, and related activities; atomic energy; 
banking, securities, and other non-insurance financial services; 
customhouse brokers; fisheries; insurance (obligation extends to 
NAFTA-level treatment); licenses for broadcast, common carrier, or 
aeronautical radio stations; COMSAT; subsidies or grants, including 
government-supported loans, guarantees and insurance; state and local 
measures exempt from Article 1102 of the North American Free 
Trade Agreement pursuant to Article 1108 thereof; landing of 
submarine cables; one-way satellite transmissions of direct-to-home 
(DTH) and direct broadcast satellite (DBS) television services and of 
digital audio services; leasing of minerals and pipeline rights of way on 
government lands, which is subject to the Mineral Lands Leasing Act. 
United States (U.S.-Ecuador) air transportation; banking; customhouse brokers; government grants; 
government insurance and loan programs; energy and power 
production; insurance; maritime services and maritime-related 
services; mining on the public domain; ocean and coastal shipping; 
ownership of real property; ownership and operation of common 
carrier radio and television stations; ownership of shares in the 
Communications Satellite Corporation; primary dealership in United 
States government securities; provision of common carrier telephone 
and telegraph services; provision of submarine cable services; and use 
of land and natural resources. 
 
Very importantly, under each of these BITs, the Andean Community (i.e. capital-importing) 
state enjoys far fewer exceptions from national treatment and MFN treatment. Thus, CAP 
states accepts much wider obligations to allow foreign entry into the economy, free from 
screening requirements or other conditions of access, and to refrain from preferencing 
domestic firms in their development strategy.32 The treaties are thus non-reciprocal in this 
critical respect. It is obviously counter-intuitive, from a development perspective, for the 
developing or capital-importing state to be required to expose itself to greater penetration by 
                                                 
32 On the other hand, even in the case of the U.S. and Canada, significant gaps are apparent where 
sectoral exceptions included in one BIT are omitted from another BIT, particularly where the latter 
permits forum-shopping. 
foreign capital than does the capital-exporting state. That is, the treaties reflect a double 
standard in that CAP states are precluded from taking steps to ensure domestic ownership 
(whether public or private) in strategic sectors where, in many cases, their developed country 
partner under the BIT is permitted to do just that.33
 
The same non-reciprocity does not arise in the case of BITs concluded by EU states 
because, as discussed above, those BITs do not extend national and MFN treatment to the 
pre-establishment stage of investment, and thus they do not necessitate sectoral exceptions 
to protect the states parties’ economies from foreign penetration and ownership.  
 
One approach to national treatment is that it is normally violated only where a state 
specifically targets a foreign investor for discriminatory treatment because the investor is 
foreign. This approach would be a reasonably predictable one that probably accords with the 
intentions of many states when BITs were negotiated. However, the interpretation of 
national treatment by tribunals has not been so straightforward. It has been characterized by 
difficult questions of, for example, whether ‘like circumstances’ must be shown to exist and, 
if so, what constitutes like circumstances; whether arbitrators should focus on treatment 
given to a single foreign investor only or on treatment given to foreign investors as a group; 
and whether the treatment afforded to foreign investors should be compared to domestic 
investors as whole or merely to any singular case where a domestic investor was treated 
more favourably. There are variations in the answers given to these questions thus far by 
tribunals, with major implications for the ability of states to assess their treaty obligations 
and liabilities. 
 
National treatment also goes beyond intended discrimination by a state to include so-called 
de facto discrimination. Thus, a violation of the standard may occur when a state measure, 
though neutral on its face, has a discriminatory effect on foreign investors relative to 
whatever category of domestic investors that is selected for comparison by the tribunal. For 
example, in Occidental No. 1, the tribunal concluded that, although Ecuador did not intend to 
discriminate against OEPC or foreign-owned firms in that case, the less favourable effects of 
the Servicio de Rentas Interna’s decision to disallow VAT refunds to the investor (and other 
oil producers) was sufficient to violate national treatment. 
 
This concept of de facto discrimination is potentially so broad that, in its extreme, any exercise 
of public authority that differentiated between investors would be prohibited. In the Pope & 
Talbot arbitration under NAFTA, the tribunal adopted this broad approach, concluding that 
‘any differences in treatment’ presumptively violates national treatment ‘unless they have a 
reasonable nexus to rational government policies that (1) do not distinguish, on their face or 
de facto, between foreign-owned and domestic companies, and (2) do not otherwise unduly 
undermine the investment liberalizing objectives of NAFTA’.34 Thus, the Pope & Talbot 
tribunal adopted an extraordinarily expansive reading of national treatment, and then 
                                                 
33 Of course, it is unlikely that CAP states would offer a sufficient base of capital in order to generate 
domestic investors that in turn could acquire significant levels of ownership and control in strategic 
sectors in the U.S. or Canada. However, by way of forum-shopping, foreign investors originating in a 
CAP state could conceivably tap capital from a third country in order to penetrate the North 
American market. 
34 Pope & Talbot Inc v Government of Canada (award on the merits, phase 2, 10 April 2001), para 78-79.  
subjected that interpretation to a vague set of exceptions. Depending on how those 
exceptions are in turn interpreted by tribunals, and given that most governmental activity 
inherently involves differentiation among subjects of regulation, a presumptive prohibition 
on any differentiation between investors effectively exposes a wide range of commonplace 




Similar to national treatment, the standard of MFN treatment requires a state to treat foreign 
investors from the other states party to the investment treaty no less favourably than it treats 
investors from third states. Thus, different protections may be extended from one BIT to 
another in the full set of treaties concluded by the state, to the benefit of investors. 
 
According to the U.K.-Ecuador BIT:35
 
‘Neither Contracting Party shall in its territory subject investments or returns of 
nationals or companies of the other Contracting Party to treatment less favourable 
than that which it accords to... national or companies of any third State. 
 
Neither Contracting Party shall in its territory subject nationals or companies of the 
other Contracting Party, as regards their management, maintenance, use, enjoyment 
or disposal of their investments, to treatment less favourable than that which it 
accords to... national or companies of any third State.’ 
 
Likewise, according to the Canada-Peru BIT:36
 
‘Each Party shall accord to investors of the other Party treatment no less favourable 
than that it accords, in like circumstances, to investors of a non-Party with respect to 
the establishment, acquisition, expansion, management, conduct, operation and sale 
or other disposition of investments in its territory.’ 
 
These clauses prohibit a state party to the BIT from giving more favourable treatment to the 
investors of any third state, including another capital-importing or developing state. An 
exception to this requirement in many BITs exists where more favourable treatment is 
granted by virtue of the state’s participation in a free trade zone, customs union, or common 
market, although the applicability of such an exception depends (as always) on the specific 
language of the BIT. 
 
The implication of a broad reading of MFN treatment, as interpreted broadly by many 
tribunals, is that investors can ‘shop around’ to pick the best set of protections available to 
them from all treaties concluded by a host state. 
 
                                                 
35 Agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the 
Government of the Republic of Ecuador for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, Art. 3. 
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When MFN treatment is relied on to extend substantive protections from one treaty to 
another treaty under which the investor has brought a claim, MFN treatment is typically 
referred to alongside the relevant substantive standard in the other treaty. Thus, in Occidental 
No. 1, the tribunal relied on the BIT’s MFN obligation to remove a requirement in that BIT 
that national treatment be limited to situations in which foreign and domestic investors were 
in like circumstances. Using MFN to drop this requirement, by referring to another BIT of 
Ecuador that did not refer explicitly to ‘in like circumstances’, the tribunal concluded that the 
combination of national treatment and MFN treatment required Ecuador to provide the 
same VAT treatment to oil ‘producers’ (such as Occidental) as it did to ‘exporters’ (which 
unlike ‘producers’ were eligible for VAT refunds under Ecuadorian law). This reading 
operated in favour of Occidental (and investors in general) by expanding the situations in 
which a state’s measure can be found to ‘discriminate’ in favour of domestic investors. 
 
In a number of cases, MFN treatment has been used, remarkably, to expand not only 
substantive obligations but also procedural aspects of a state’s underlying consent to 
compulsory arbitration. Thus, some BITs contain limitations on the investor’s right to bring 
a BIT claim (such as a fork in the road clause or a duty of the investor to exhaust local 
remedies). In Maffezini37 and other arbitrations,38 such limitations were discarded on the basis 
that a commitment to MFN treatment encompassing procedural benefits of other treaties 
that were more favourable to the investor. Other tribunals, on the other hand, have rejected 
this interpretation of MFN treatment, concluding that MFN does not extend beyond 
substantive protections unless the relevant MFN clause clearly refers to procedural 
protections as well. The Maffezini position exposes a state to compulsory arbitration with 
respect to all its investment treaties where it has consented to compulsory arbitration in just 
a single BIT. The latter position, on the other hand, probably corresponds to the views of 
most states when the treaties were negotiated (if they turned their mind to the issue). 
 
Fair & equitable treatment (including full protection and security) 
 
Typically, investment treaties require host states to afford ‘fair and equitable treatment’, as 
well as ‘full protection and security’, to foreign investors. Different treaties phrase these 
obligations in different ways, but all provide for a minimum level of treatment that states 
must provide to foreign investors. Thus, regardless of the treatment given to a state’s own 
investors, the treatment of foreign investors must not fall below this floor set by the treaty. 
 
To illustrate, the Spain-Bolivia BIT provides:39
 
‘Las inversiones realizadas por inversores de una Parte Contratante en el territorio de 
la otra Parte Contratante recibirán un tratamiento justo y equitativo y disfrután de 
plena protección y seguridad. Ninguna de las Partes Contratantes deberá, en ningún 
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caso, otorgar a tales inversiones tratamiento menos favorable que el requerido por el 
Derecho Internacional.’ 
 
Similarly, according to the Canada-Ecuador BIT:40
 
‘Each Contracting Party shall accord investments or returns of investors of the other 
Contracting Party: (a) fair and equitable treatment in accordance with principles of 
international law, and (b) full protection and security.’ 
 
Finally, according to the Netherlands-Peru BIT:41
 
‘Each Contracting Party shall ensure fair and equitable treatment to the investments 
of nationals of the other Contracting Party and shall not impair, by unreasonable or 
discriminatory measures, the operation, management, maintenance, use, enjoyment 
or disposal thereof by those nationals. 
 
More particularly, each Contracting Party shall accord to such investments full 
security and protection....’ 
 
The fair and equitable treatment standard has been relied on more often than any other as a 
basis for finding a violation of the treaty and awarding damages against the state. This is not 
surprising given the variety of meanings that can be attached to the standard, and the very 
wide range of government activity that can potentially be scrutinized on grounds that it was 
‘unfair’ or ‘inequitable’. 
 
The CMS award against Argentina gives an example of a broad interpretation of the 
standard. Here the tribunal concluded that fair and equitable treatment, although ‘somewhat 
vague’, nevertheless required Argentina to maintain a stable legal and business environment 
in the midst of a financial crisis, and that this was ‘an objective requirement unrelated to 
whether [Argentina] has had any deliberate intention or bad faith…’.42 On this expansive 
reading, the tribunal decided that Argentina’s devaluation of the peso violated its BIT with 
the U.S., requiring payment of a large award to a U.S. investor and heightening the prospect 
of further awards (which have indeed followed) against the country. Also, the CMS tribunal, 
along with other tribunals, has rejected Argentina’s argument (echoed by other states, 
including the U.S. and Canada) that fair and equitable treatment is simply a component of, 
and thus limited by, the ‘minimum standard of treatment’ as understood in customary 
international law. In response to this submission by states, tribunals have tended either to 
reject the argument outright or to adopt an expansive view of the customary standard itself, 
typically with little or no discussion of relevant sources of international law. Thus, the CMS 
tribunal – without mention of state practice and opinio juris, relevant cases, or academic 
writings on international law – incredibly concluded that its far-reaching approach to fair and 
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equitable treatment under the U.S.-Argentina BIT was ‘not different from the international 
law minimum standard and its evolution under customary international law’.43
 
A similarly expansive reading of fair and equitable treatment was adopted by the tribunal in 
Occidental No. 1, leading to a substantial award against Ecuador, as discussed above. On the 
whole, it is this standard that presents the greatest uncertainty, and thus the greatest threat, 
to fiscal planning and regulatory decision-making on the part of states. The standards places 
an alarmingly wide-ranging discretionary power in the hands of arbitrators to decide how 
states should resolve conflicts between investors and other social groups according to the 
collective interest of the community as a whole. 
 
Limitations on expropriation, including ‘regulatory’ expropriation 
 
A well-known motivation for the conclusion of BITs was to protect assets of foreign 
investor from expropriation or nationalization by the host state. According to the U.S.-
Bolivia BIT:44
 
‘Neither Party shall expropriate or nationalize a covered investment either directly or 
indirectly through measures tantamount to expropriation or nationalization... except 
for a public purpose; in a non-discriminatory manner; upon payment of prompt, 
adequate and effective compensation; and in accordance with due process of law and 
the general principles of treatment provided for in Article II (providing for fair and 
equitable treatment).’ 
 
And, under the Spain-Peru BIT:45
 
‘La nacionalización, expropriación, o cualquier otra medida de características o 
efectos similares que pueda ser adoptada por las autoridades de una parte contratante 
contra las inversiones de inversores de la otra parte contratante en su territorio 
deberá aplicarese exclusivamente por razones de necesidad o utilidad publica 
conforme a las disposiciones legales y en ningún caso será discrimnatoria. La parte 
contratatnte que adoptara estas medidas pagara al inversor o a su derecho-habiente, 
sin demora injustificada, una indemnización adecuada, en moneda convertible y 
libremente tranferible.’ 
 
What was less anticipated was the degree to which these expropriation standards were open 
to expansive interpretations going beyond direct expropriation to include so-called indirect 
or ‘creeping’ or ‘regulatory’ expropriation by the state. So, general measures of the state that 
leave an investor’s ownership title intact, but that otherwise cause the investor economic 
harm (even incidental harm, potentially) may be regarded as a compensable expropriation 
that requires payment of market value damages to the investor. This broad definition was 
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adopted, for example, in the (infamous) decision in Metalclad, where the tribunal concluded 
that expropriation included:46
 
… not only open, deliberate and acknowledged takings of property, such as outright 
seizure or formal or obligatory transfer of title in favour of the host State, but also 
covert or incidental interference with the use of property which has the effect of 
depriving the owner, in whole or in significant part, of the use or reasonably-to-be-
expected economic benefit of property even if not necessarily to the obvious benefit 
of the host State. 
 
Such a broad reading is possible under virtually all investment treaties (with the qualified 
exception of some recent treaties concluded by the U.S. and Canada that limit the scope of 
regulatory expropriation to an extent) and would require compensation for any exercise of 
public authority that significantly reduced the value of an investment. According to Tysoe J. 
of the British Columbia Supreme Court in Canada, the reading of expropriation adopted by 
the tribunal in Metalclad was ‘extremely broad’ and ‘sufficiently broad to include a legitimate 
rezoning of property by a municipality or other zoning authority’.47
 
To illustrate further, a similarly expansive interpretation was adopted in the Tecmed 
arbitration under the Spain-Mexico BIT. Here the tribunal declined to consider public 
benefits of government acts that are indirectly expropriatory as a basis for differentiating 
expropriation from regulation. It declared: ‘we find no principle stating that regulatory 
administrative actions are per se excluded from the scope of the [BIT], even if they are 
beneficial to society as a whole – such as environmental protection’.48
 
Prohibitions on performance requirements 
 
 
All BITs that contain a national treatment obligation prohibit performance requirements that 
treat foreign investors less favourably than domestic investors. On the other hand, BITs 
typically do not prohibit any benefits that are given to foreign investors, but not domestic 
investors. BITs concluded by the U.S. and Canada, modeled after NAFTA, go further by 
prohibiting a specific list of performance requirements at both the pre-establishment and 
post-establishment stage, even where the performance requirements are applied to domestic 
as swell as foreign investors. The prohibitions apply to various performance requirements 
that governments have put in place as entry conditions for foreign investors. Asian states in 
particular used this tool historically as a component, alongside market mechanisms, of their 
industrial development strategies.49 Typically, such conditions require the investor to export 
a minimum proportion of its production or to use a minimum proportion of local employees 
or inputs in its domestic operations. The objective of such performance requirements was to 
promote a wider policy of export-oriented development, employment, and enhanced 
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linkages between foreign investments and the domestic economy, and many states achieved 
success by the use of these tools for these purposes. 
 
Typically, a prohibition on performance requirements (besides the basic national treatment 
obligation) in an investment treaty gives a list of the specific types of requirements that are 
barred. According to the U.S.-Bolivia BIT:50
 
‘Neither Party shall mandate or enforce, as a condition for the establishment, 
acquisition, expansion, management, conduct or operation of a covered investment, 
any requirement (including any commitment or undertaking in connection with the 
receipt of a governmental permission or authorization): 
 
(a) to achieve a particular level or percentage of local content, or to purchase, use or 
otherwise give a preference to products or services of domestic origin or from any 
domestic source; 
 
(b) to restrict imports by the investment of products or services in relation to a 
particular volume or value of production, exports or foreign exchange earnings; 
 
(c) to export a particular type, level or percentage of products or services, either 
generally or to a specific market region; 
 
(d) to restrict sales by the investment of products or services in the Party’s territory 
in relation to a particular volume or value of production, exports or foreign exchange 
earnings; 
 
(e) to transfer technology, a production process or other proprietary knowledge to a 
national or company in the Party’s territory, except pursuant to an order, 
commitment or undertaking that is enforced by a court, administrative tribunal or 
competition authority to remedy an alleged or adjudicated violation of competition 
laws; or 
 
(f) to carry out a particular type, level or percentage of research and development in 
the Party’s territory. 
 
Such requirements do not include conditions for the receipt or continued receipt of 
an advantage.’  
 
This list provides a shopping list of the steps taken by many states as part of a wider 
development policy to expand the domestic economy and support national centres of 
capital. 
 
That said, as mentioned above, even in the absence of an express prohibition on 
performance requirements – and based on the more general standard of national treatment 
under EC-based treaties that do not include such detailed prohibitions – it remains within 
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the discretion of tribunals to conclude that these types of measures are discriminatory and 
therefore prohibited where applied at the post-establishment stage, after an investor is 
admitted into the host economy. For this reason, the fact that EC-based BITs do not 
contain detailed prohibitions does not preclude them having an effect similar to U.S. or 
Canadian BITs where the performance requirement is applied post-establishment. This is 
especially the case where market access for European investors has been agreed by way of an 
Economic Partnership Agreement. As discussed below, the EU-CARIFORUM EPA also 
contains its own prohibition on a detailed list of prohibitions on performance requirements, 
including at the pre-establishment and the post-establishment stage, although this EPA 
obligation would presumably not be subject directly to investor-state arbitration under a 
BIT. 
 
Umbrella clauses and BIT arbitration of disputes arising from an investment contract 
 
An ‘umbrella clause’ creates a duty of the state to observe or respect its obligations to 
foreign investors beyond the BIT itself. Thus, the state assumes an obligation under the 
treaty to respect any obligation that is has entered into by way of a contract, administrative 
order, or other legal instrument that is not part of the treaty itself. 
 
According to the U.S.-Ecuador BIT: ‘Each Party shall observe any obligation it may have 
entered into with regard to investments’.51 Alternatively, the Switzerland-Bolivia BIT 
provides:52
 
‘Chacune des Parties Contractantes assure à tout moment le respect des engagements 
assumés par elle à l’égard des investissements des ressortissants et sociétés de l’autre 
Partie Contractante.’ 
 
Not all BITs contain an umbrella clause. A difficulty with those that do is the creation of 
two parallel systems to enforce the underlying obligation to which the umbrella clause 
applies (i.e. one system of enforcement under the treaty and another under the contract or 
other legal instrument). It is common for disputes arising from investment contracts to be 
submitted to arbitration under the BIT in lieu of (or even in addition to) the alternative legal 
process that can be pursued under the dispute settlement clause of the contract. 
 
This leads to a number of complexities. In particular, BITs have generally been interpreted 
by arbitrators to allow what is essentially the same dispute (between the state or a state entity 
and the foreign investor or a domestic company owned by the foreign investor) to be 
submitted to the BIT tribunal in addition to whatever court or tribunal (whether domestic or 
international) that has the authority to resolve disputes under the underlying contract. Thus, 
in such circumstances, the investor who brings the BIT claim can also bring a parallel claim 
(or claims) outside of the BIT. This means that the investor, in the context of a single 
dispute, may be able to pursue two different legal proceedings in order to pressure the state 
and win compensation from it, arguably in violation of the principle that a party should be 
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able to litigate a claim only once, and accept the result that is reached in the litigation that it 
pursued. Also, this means that investors – having agreed in a contract with the state to 
accept one form of dispute settlement, such as domestic courts, as a condition of the 
investor’s rights and responsibilities under the contract – has been allowed by BIT tribunals 
to avoid this commitment by litigating a contractual dispute under a BIT. Lastly, in most 
cases, disputes that are subject to an umbrella clause tend to arise in the context of sectors 
that were privatized by the state and then subjected to regulatory requirements or reforms 
opposed by the foreign investor. Privatization programs that were originally planned by the 
state to be under the authority of a domestic court or tribunal have in many cases been 
opened to international arbitration by the liberal interpretation of an umbrella clause in the 
BIT. 
 
An example of both of these aspects of umbrella clauses is offered by the Duke Energy award 
against Ecuador. Here a dispute arose from contracts entered into between two firms (both 
of which became claimants under the BIT) and Ecuador dealing with the generation of 
electrical power in Guayaquil. One claimant, Electroquil (later purchased by the other 
claimant, the U.S. firm Duke Energy), was the first private power generator to have been 
established in Ecuador (in 1992) following an energy privatization programme. From 1995, 
the Instituto Ecuatoriano de Electrificación (INECEL) entered into power purchase 
contracts with Electroquil to provide power until 1996. In this year, however, the process of 
electricity contracting was liberalized and INECEL was liquidated by legislation, and the 
Ministry of Mines and Energy assumed INECEL’s rights and obligations. Under the power 
purchase contracts, fuel was to be supplied to Guayaquil by the state entity Petrocomercial 
and paid for by INECEL. 
 
A dispute over alleged non-payment by Petroecuador for power supplied under the power 
purchase contracts, and over the imposition of fines by INECEL against Electroquil for its 
alleged failure to satisfy its obligations, led to a contractual arbitration claim by Electroquil 
before the Arbitration and Mediation Center of the Guayaquil Chamber of Commerce. This 
claim was dismissed by the tribunal on the basis that the contractual arbitration clause was 
invalid under Ecuadorian law. However, Duke Energy and Electroquil then brought the BIT 
claim over outstanding disputes under the contract. Thus, they avoided an unfavourable 
result in the forum for dispute settlement that had been agreed to in the contract itself by 
relying in an umbrella clause in a BIT. 
 
In its decision, the BIT tribunal in Duke Energy concluded that INECEL had breached its 
payment obligations arising from the power purchase agreements and that some of the fines 
levied against Electroquil were unjustified (although the tribunal found no bad faith on the 
part of Ecuador). In turn, the tribunal found that these contractual breaches constituted a 
violation of Ecuador’s BIT umbrella clause obligation to ‘observe any obligation it may have 
entered into with respect to investments’. (The tribunal also found a violation of fair and 
equitable treatment standard on the basis that Ecuador ‘deceived Duke Energy’s reasonable 
expectations’ by not implementing a payment guarantee). However, the tribunal limited its 
damages award to what it described as the ‘nominal sum’ of approximately (US)$5.7 million 
plus interest. Even so, this was $5.7 million more than what Ecuador was obliged to pay to 
the investors under the contractual dispute settlement provisions that Electroquil (and, as 
Elecroquil’s owner, Duke Energy) had agreed to in the contract itself. 
 
Another illustration of the tensions arising from parallel claims under both a BIT and a 
contract, involving the water sector, arose in Aguas del Aconquija.53 The dispute was rooted in 
a 1995 concession contract between Compagnie Générale des Eaux (CGE) and an Argentine 
affiliate, on the one hand, and the government of Tucumán, a province of Argentina, on the 
other hand. The concession followed a decision by the Tucumán government to privatize its 
water and sewage facilities. The contract contained detailed provisions on the service CGE 
would provide, tariffs it would charge, and investments it would make. After the agreement 
was concluded, disputes arose between CGE and Tucumán over various issues including the 
method for measuring water consumption, the level of tariffs, the timing and percentage of 
any increase in tariffs, the remedy for non-payment of tariffs, the right of CGE to pass-
through to customers certain taxes, and the quality of the water delivered. 
 
CGE alleged that the Tucumán government tried to frustrate its operation of the concession. 
According to CGE, this was part of a ‘concerted public attack… which included a series of 
inflammatory statements and other acts encouraging customers not to pay their bills’. 
Attempts to renegotiate the concession occurred between CGE and Tucumán and, in time, 
the national government. Negotiations led to a 1997 framework agreement but, according to 
CGE, the governor of Tucumán changed the terms of this agreement before submitting the 
necessary implementing legislation to the Tucumán legislature. Further negotiations failed 
and CGE sought to rescind the concession on grounds of alleged default by Tucumán. 
Tucumán rejected the CGE notice of rescission and terminated the concession itself, alleging 
default of performance by CGE. Ten months later, the national government assumed 
responsibility for the operation of the water and sewage system. 
 
CGE brought a claim under the France-Argentina BIT. Its argument was that, although 
Argentina was not a party to its concession contract with the government of Tucumán, 
Argentina had nevertheless failed to prevent Tucumán from its alleged actions concerning 
the concession contract and thus infringed the investor’s entitlements to protection under 
the BIT. Yet, the concession itself provided for disputes arising under it to be submitted to 
the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tucumán administrative courts. In light of this, the BIT 
tribunal refused CGE’s claim on the basis that, for the tribunal to resolve it, the tribunal 
would have to undertake a detailed interpretation and application of the contract, a task that 
was left by the contracting parties to the Tucumán administrative courts. Also, the tribunal 
held that Argentina’s actions did not constitute a direct breach of the BIT. Following a 
challenge to this decision by CGE, the decision was overturned by an ICSID annulment 
panel of three arbitrators (all appointed by the Chair of the ICSID Administrative Council, 
i.e. the World Bank President). A new tribunal was constituted, the BIT was permitted to 
proceed in spite of the dispute settlement clause in the contract, and Argentina was found to 
have violated the BIT, leading to an award of roughly (U.S.)$142 million, including interest, 
to the investor. 
 
Ultimately, these cases demonstrates how umbrella clauses have been interpreted by BIT 
tribunals to allow investors to avoid their commitments to accept the authority of domestic 
courts or tribunals in any disputes arising under a contract concluded between the investor 
and a state entity. In turn, states have been ordered by arbitrators to pay substantial damages 
                                                 
53 Compañía de Aguas del Aconquija S.A. and Vivendi Universal v. Argentine Republic (award on jurisdiction, 
12 November 2000). 
to these investors in disputes arising from privatization programs, even when the terms of 
the privatization contracts limited the state’s liabilities to orders issued by domestic courts 
and tribunals. Thus, umbrella clauses in BITs have made the liabilities of states arising from 
privatization programmes far more extensive that they first appeared at the time the program 
was put in place. 
 
V INVESTMENT LIBERALIZATION UNDER EPAs 
 
The EU has proposed to conclude Economic Partnership Agreements with a number of 
developing states, including Andean Community states. The first such EPA was concluded 
between the EU and the CARIFORUM states in late 2007. This reports looks to the text of 
that EPA as a model for the investment and services liberalization provisions that an EPA 
with CAP states would potentially contain. 
 
At the outset, it is important to note that ‘services’ liberalization, where it involves the 
removal of restrictions on foreign ownership and operation in certain sectors of a host 
economy, also involves the liberalization of investment. The two concepts overlap; a 
‘service’ may be, or may be comprised of, an investments. Likewise, an investor will often be 
a service supplier, and vice versa.54 Thus, when one speaks of the liberalization of services by 
the removal of domestic measures restricting the establishment of foreign service suppliers 
in a host economy, one also speaks of liberalization of investment, particularly in terms of 
pre-establishment or market access privileges. 
 
The EPA model provides, in short,55 for the states parties to remove restrictions on foreign 
ownership of their economy in those sectors where they undertake positive commitments to 
liberalize. The commitment to allow market access in liberalized sectors in the EU-
CARIFORUM EPA states as follows:56
 
‘With respect to market access through commercial presence, the EC Party and the 
Signatory CARIFORUM States shall accord to commercial presences and investors 
of each other a treatment no less favourable than that provided for in the specific 
commitments contained in Annex […] (commitments on investment and trade in 
services).’ 
 
The EPA model also prohibits, in liberalized sectors, a variety of performance requirement 
commonly used by states to restrict or screen foreign investment, with a view to enhancing 
its benefits for the host economy. In particular the EU-CARIFORUM EPA states:57  
 
‘In sectors where market access commitments are undertaken, the measures which 
the EC Party and the Signatory CARIFORUM States shall not maintain or adopt 
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either on the basis of a regional subdivision or on the basis of its entire territory, 
unless otherwise specified in Annex […] (commitments on investment and trade in 
services) are defined as: 
 
(a) limitations on the number of commercial presences whether in the form of 
numerical quotas, monopolies, exclusive rights or other commercial presence 
requirements such as economic needs tests; 
 
(b) limitations on the total value of transactions or assets in the form of numerical 
quotas or the requirement of an economic needs test; 
 
(c) limitations on the total number of operations or on the total quantity of output 
expressed in terms of designated numerical units in the form of quotas or the 
requirement of an economic needs test58.  
 
(d) limitations on the participation of foreign capital in terms of maximum 
percentage limit on foreign shareholding or the total value of individual or aggregate 
foreign investment; and 
 
(e) measures which restrict or require specific types of establishment (subsidiary, 
branch, representative office)59 or joint ventures through which an investor of the 
other Party may perform an economic activity.’ 
 
Thus, states parties to the EPA are precluded from imposing a variety of restrictions or 
conditions on foreign investment, including limits on the number or share of foreign firms 
in a sector, limits on the proportion of a firm or industry that is foreign-owned, the use of an 
economic needs test to approve proposed investments, or requirements to engage in joint 
ventures with local firms. The prohibition is comparable to the detailed prohibitions on 
performance requirements that are contained in BITs concluded by the U.S. or Canada, 
although applying to the pre-establishment stage only where investments are permitted 
according to the EPA’s positive list of commitments to liberalize. 
 
The EPA model establishes further an obligation of national treatment that is likely to 
preclude performance requirements that are designed to encourage economic linkages or 
protect domestic enterprises. According to the EU-CARIFORUM EPA:60
 
‘1. In the sectors where market access commitments are inscribed in Annex [...] 
(commitments on investment and trade in services) and subject to any conditions 
and qualifications set out therein, with respect to all measures affecting commercial 
presence, the EC Party and the Signatory CARIFORUM States shall grant to 
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commercial presences and investors of each other treatment no less favourable than 
that they accord to their own like commercial presences and investors.’ 
 
By way of this provision, the states parties to the EPA are precluded from treating domestic 
firms in a way that alters the conditions of competition in their favour relative to foreign 
firms. (Note that, like BITs, the EPA does not prohibit states from treating foreign investors 
more favourably than their domestic counterparts.) The obligation thus appears to bar states 
from applying performance requirements (other than via subsidies,61 meaning the 
attachment of conditions by the state to the eligibility of a firm for direct payments of 
financial support by the state) to foreign investment as a condition of their commercial 
presence including, for example, requirements to employ local personnel, use local materials, 
produce for export, or otherwise establish linkages with the domestic economy or protect 
domestic enterprises. 
 
A key purpose of EPAs for the EU is thus to provide market access for European investors 
that complements and activates the post-establishment protections that already exist for 
these investors under existing BITs between EC states and CAP states. As noted above, 
unlike BITs concluded by the U.S. and Canada, European BITs do not require the removal 
of restrictions on foreign ownership or of other conditions of entry by foreign investors. 
That is, they do not extend the state’s national treatment obligation to the pre-establishment 
stage of an investment. A critical purpose of provisions on investment and services 
liberalization in EPAs is to oblige CAP states to remove such restrictions in order to 
facilitate penetration by European firms into the host economy, including its strategic 
sectors, which will then trigger the elaborate post-establishment protections provided by 
existing BITs. 
 
As a result, when it opens a sector to foreign investment, a CAP state faces the prospect of 
rapid penetration of its economy in the relevant sector, and corresponding expanded 
liabilities under its BITs. In the experience of some Latin American states that liberalized 
strategic sectors such as water, electricity, or telecommunications in the 1990s – especially 
Argentina – these liabilities have manifested themselves in a flood of investor claims, the 
costs of which have been severe. Argentina has faced dozens of claims under its BITs, and 
seven awards to date totaling approximately $752 million in damages, in disputes arising 
mainly from sectors liberalized, and purchased by foreign investors, in the 1990s. These 
claims have led to damages awards against Argentina in spite of the fact that the foreign 
investor in many cases took major risks by borrowing in hard currency to finance asset 
acquisitions in Argentina, while relying for revenues on payments by consumers in local 
currency. Despite this business decision of investors, arbitrators have awarded them with 
market value compensation, at the expense of Argentinian taxpayers, for their losses 
arising from general reforms passed by Argentina in the face of a severe financial crisis. 
 
Further, as discussed earlier, the treaty liabilities accompanying foreign investment, once 
markets are opened under an EPA, have a strong potential to deter states from taking 
steps on behalf of consumers and the population to ensure quality, reliability, and 
accessibility of essential services, where doing so may trigger a dispute with a foreign 
                                                 
61 EU-CARIFORUM Economic Partnership Agreement, Part II, Title II, Article 1(3). 
investor. The experiences of Argentina in Aguas del Aconquija and Bolivia in Aguas del 
Tunari, as discussed above, demonstrate this dynamic. 
 
EPAs must therefore be understood as blocks that build on the existing arbitration 
mechanisms of BITs. The EPA does not provide for compulsory investor-state arbitration; 
its dispute settlement mechanism relies on state-state arbitration. However, by concluding an 
EPA, the state exposes itself to BIT claims by European investors whose investments are 
made possible only by the market access commitments in an EPA. The critical point is that, 
once the investor enters the state’s economy, all of the post-establishment obligations of the 
under its relevant BITs are triggered. 
 
Lastly, any specific or general exceptions contained in an EPA – for measures of public 
health or environmental protection, for example – would not apply to the obligations that a 
state has undertaken pursuant to a BIT. Only rarely to BITs concluded by EU states contain 
broad exceptions for measures undertaken for reasons of public interest and, even when 
they do, such exceptions typically do not extend to the provisions most commonly relied on 
by tribunals to find a violation of the treaty and order the state to pay damages (especially, 
fair & equitable treatment and limitations on expropriation). Thus, for example, the Spain-
Bolivia BIT provides:62
 
‘Las medidas que se adopten por razones de orden público o seguridad y salud 
pública no se considerarán tratamiento ‹‹menos favorables›› en el sentido del presente 
artículo.’ 
 
However, this exception applies only to the state parties’ obligations to provide national 
treatment and MFN treatment to foreign investors. Moreover, the fact that this exception is 
not included in Spain’s BITs with Colombia, Ecuador, or Peru has the alarming implication 
that public security and public health measures are not excused from national treatment and 
MFN treatment obligations under these other BITs (or even under the Bolivia-Spain BIT 
itself, if the MFN clause in that BIT was read liberally to eliminate the exception based on its 





BITs presents major fiscal risks to governmental decision-making in a range of sectors, 
including strategic sectors such as the extractive sector, transportation, banking and financial 
services, government insurance, state enterprises, broadcasting, telephone services, and social 
services. Those risks arise primarily from the threat of investor claims that a state is exposed 
to as a result of broadly-framed standards of investor protection in BITs and the proclivity 
of many arbitration tribunal to interpret those standards broadly in favour of investors. The 
system thus shifts political bargaining power dramatically in favour of the business interests 
of multinational firms and against other social interests that stand to benefit from measures 
to regulate investors or attach conditions to the entry of foreign investment into the 
domestic economy. 
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BIT claims are resolved by tribunals with compulsory jurisdiction over host state and 
constituted under the authority of organizations at which voting power is concentrated in 
the major capital-exporting states or representatives of multinational firms (as in the case of 
the World Bank and the International Chamber of Commerce, respectively). Given the 
apparent bias – arising from the financial interest of the arbitration industry – in favour of 
investors and against respondents, present arrangements for investment treaty arbitration are 
understandably regarded to be unfair to developing, capital-importing states. It is of course 
true that investors have been unsuccessful in many cases under investment treaties, but they 
have also won many claims and received substantial damages following expansively pro-
investor interpretations of the treaties by tribunals. 
 
In this environment, in order to protect the regulatory flexibility and responsiveness of 
government, states should consider a number of steps to limit their BIT liabilities. First, they 
should seek to evaluate whether their BITs have in fact generated increased investment in a 
manner that is desirable to the host state’s economic objectives. In the absence of clear 
evidence that this is the case, a state should limit its commitments to compulsory arbitration 
to consents given in investment contracts, where the state is in a stronger position to link 
such a commitment to actual commitments to invest capital. Existing BITs that do not 
deliver a demonstrable benefit in terms of increased investment seek either be abrogated at 
the earliest opportunity or subjected to renegotiation with the other state party in order to 
excoriate their most problematic aspects (including liberal provisions on forum-shopping, an 
MFN clause that may be extended to procedural aspects of other BITs, and the allocation of 
the authority to appoint arbitrators to business organizations). Notably, in order to remove 
its liabilities under investment treaties, a state must seek to limit or withdraw its consents to 
compulsory arbitration in BITs (and regional treaties) and not simply to withdraw from 
ICSID or from the ICSID Convention. Most BITs allow investors to bring claims not only 
before ICSID but also in other forums, for instance pursuant to the UNCITRAL Rules. 
 
Lastly, the EU’s project to conclude EPAs with developing states must be understood in 
terms of the interaction between, on the one hand, the market access provisions of the EPA 
– designed to apply to the pre-establishment stage of investment – and on the other hand 
the elaborate, broadly-framed post-establishment protections offered by BITs. Developing 
states that allow penetration of the home economy by foreign capital under an EPA risk 
some very unwelcome surprises if and when foreign firms later come to dispute aspects of 
their regulatory treatment by a host government. 
APPENDIX A 
 
Known BIT claims against CAP states 
(as at 19 August 2008) 
 






Claimant and sector Host state measure Resolution 
Bolivia Aguas del 
Tunari 




Claimant ADT was Bolivian 
company, owned by series of Dutch 
companies, in turn owned by U.S. 
firm Bechtel. 
 
Claim arose from 1999 concession 
contract between ADT and Bolivia’s 
Superintendant of Water for exclusive 
delivery of water and sewage services 
for city of Cochabamba over 40-year 
period. The city’s water system was 
previously run by the state agency 
SEMAPA. 
 
At time of the concession, 20% of 
shares in ADT were divided among 
four Bolivian companies, 25% were 
owned by Uruguay company 
Riverstar International, and 55% were 
owned by Cayman Islands-based 
International Water which was 100% 
owned by U.S. firm Bechtel. 
 
The concession contract was subject 
Various acts and omissions of 
Bolivia concerning the 
concession agreement, alleged to 
have breached the BIT. 
Claim settled in early 2006. Both claimant and 
Bolivia agreed to drop financial claims against the 
other and that ‘the concession was terminated only 
because of the civil unrest and the state of 
emergency in Cochabamba and not because of any 
act done or not done by the international 
shareholders of Aguas del Tunari’. The settlement 
followed the extensive public pressure on Bechtel to 
withdraw BIT claim. 
 
Tribunal: U.S. national David Caron, presiding 
(appointed by Chair of the ICSID Administrative 
Council – i.e. the President of the World Bank); 
Canadian national Henri Alvarez (appointed by 
investor); Mexican national Jose Alberro-Semerena, 
(appointed by Bolivia). 
 
Tribunal found jurisdiction. Tribunal allowed claim 
under Netherlands-Bolivia BIT despite forum-
shopping by Bechtel via the corporate 
reorganization that followed mounting public 
controversy over the concession. It concluded that 
the corporate re-organization did not breach the 
concession contract and that it was not necessary to 
order production of documents regarding alleged 
misrepresentations by Bechtel. In a detailed analysis, 
of public controversy and criticism by 
citizens’ groups from at least the time 
it was signed until its termination in 
2000 following a major escalation of 
public protests. A concern of citizens’ 
groups was that the concession would 
make illegal the existing communal 
water systems, previously 
autonomous of SEMAPA, on which 
many of the city’s inhabitants relied. 
Great hardship was also caused by 
substantial increase in rates that were 
implemented shortly under the 
concession. 
 
ADT was aware of and engaged in 
the public debate from shortly after 
the initiation of the concession. 
Notably, after the concession and 
controversy began, the Cayman 
Islands company International Water 
was ‘migrated’ to Luxembourg and its 
ownership was transferred to a Dutch 
company in turn owned (via other 
Dutch companies) by Bechtel and 
(apparently) the UK firm Edison. The 
insertion of this Dutch holding 
company into the ownership chain 
for the concession contract allowed 
for a claim to be brought under the 
Netherlands-Bolivia BIT. 
the Tribunal also concluded that there was sufficient 
control of ADT by the relevant Dutch holding 
companies to allow the BIT claim. 
 
Dissenting opinion by arbitrator Alberro-Semerena 
would have dismissed the claim on the basis that the 
corporate reorganization took place after another 
proposal to insert a Dutch holding company into 
the corporate structure had been rejected by 
Bolivian authorities. This indicated deception or 
misrepresentation on the issue of the nationality of 
the investors under the concession agreement. 
 
Tribunal also rejected a petition by non-
governmental organizations to participate in the 
proceeding on the basis that it had no jurisdiction to 
do so without the consent of the disputing parties. 
 
See awards dated 21 October 2005; Investment 
Treaty News reports dated 20 January 2006 and 9 
May 2007; Bechtel press release dated 19 January 
2006. 
Bolivia Quimica e 
Industrial 
del Borax 




Claimant is a Chilean chemical firm 
that owns majority stake in Bolivian 
mining company Non-Metallic 
Minerals. 
 
Rescission of Non-Metalic 
Minerals’ mining concession in 
2004 reportedly because the 
company systematically withheld 
information from the national 
customs regarding taxes and for 
auditing purposes and because 
Tribunal: Swiss national Gabrielle Kaufmann-
Kohler, presiding (unknown whether appointed by 
ICSID or by agreement of the parties); Canadian 
national Marc Lalonde (presumably appointed by 
the investor); French national Brigitte Stern 
(presumably appointed by Bolivia). 
Non-Metallic Minerals had a mining 
concession for the exploitation of 
ulexite in Salar de Uyuni. 
 
 
its declared ulexite exports did 
not coincide with the cargo 
amounts transported. 
 
No jurisdictional award issued. 
 










Euro Telecom is reportedly 
incorporated in the Netherlands and 
wholly owned by Dutch company 
International Communication 
Holding, which is in turn owned 
100% by Telecom Italia International, 
also a Dutch company, in turn owned 
100% by Italian company Telecom 
Italia, in turn owned by Spanish 
Telefonica (42.3%), among others. 
 
Euro Telecom reportedly owns 50% 
of ENTEL, a company that provides 
more than 60% of Bolivia’s telephone 
services. 
Renationalization of Bolivian 
telecommunications company 
ENTEL after Euro Telecom 
allegedly failed to meet 
investment requirements and 
pay taxes and tax-related fines. 
Negotiations regarding 
appropriate compensation were 
unsuccessful. 
Claim is ongoing; tribunal not yet constituted; no 
jurisdictional award issued. 
 
Attempt by Euro Telecom to freeze assets of 
Bolivia and ENTEL (on the basis that Bolivia has 
refused to recognize ICSID’s jurisdiction) in the UK 
was rejected by the Court of Appeal. Other attempts 
to freeze assets are ongoing in other jurisdictions. 
 
European Commission has reportedly intervened 
with Bolivia in support of Telecom Italia. 
 
See UK court decision of 28 July 2008; ICSID 
website; Investment Treaty News report dated 17 
January 2008; open letter of Corporate Europe 
Observatory to EC. 
Ecuador Repsol v 
Petroecuad
or 
2001 Not a treaty 
claim but rather a 
contract-based 
claim. Case is 
noted here to 
avoid confusion 
with Repsol claim 
Contract between Repsol and 
Petroecuador (owned by Government 
of Ecuador) for oil exploration and 
production. 
 
Government of Ecuador sought 
negotiate changes to the service 
contract under which Repsol 
operated for a share-purchase 
agreement. A dispute arose over 
alleged non-payment of accounts 
as between the first and second 
Tribunal: Costa Rican national Rodrigo Oreamuno 
Blanco, presiding; Ecuadorian national Eduardo 
Camigniani Valencia; Ecuadorian national Alberto 
Wray Espinosa. 
 








finding jurisdiction, tribunal dismissed Ecuador’s 
argument, among others, that the dispute had 
already been resolved by the National Hydrocarbons 
Board. Tribunal awarded approximately (US)$14 
million to investor. 
 
Petroecuador’s application for annulment rejected. 
Annulment tribunal (all members appointed by 
Chair of ICSID Administrative Council – i.e. the 
President of the World Bank): US national Judd 
Kessler, presiding; Italian national Piero Bernardini; 
Chilean national Gonzalo Biggs. 
 
See annulment tribunal award dated 8 January 2008; 
H. Perez Loose, ‘Ecuadorian Request to Annul An 
Icsid Award is Denied’ (7 February 2007) 
www.mondaq.com. 




Claimant is a U.S. corporation 
established under New York law. 
 
An Ecuadorian subsidiary of IBM 
was party to a concession contract 
with the Republic of Ecuador’s 
Ministry of Finances and Public 
Credit. IBM claimed that money due 
to its subsidiary had not been paid. 
 
The contract was for the provision of 
Information Technology services. 
Alleged non-payment of monies 
owing under a concession 
contract. 
Claim settled confidentially in July 2004. 
 
Tribunal: Ecuadorian national Jijon Letort, presiding 
(method of appointment unknown); Ecuadorian 
national Ponce Martinez (method of appointment 
unknown); Roldos Aguilera (method of 
appointment unknown). 
 
Jurisdiction found. IBM found to have an 
investment under the treaty in the form of the 
concession contract itself as well as IBM’s 
contractual right to collect monies. By its consent to 
arbitration in the BIT, Ecuador ‘irrevocably 
commits itself to the ICSID jurisdiction for the 
 solution of disputes arising from the BIT’ and 
Ecuador ‘cannot unilaterally withdraw itself from 
the duties it acquired in a sovereign manner when it 
freely negotiated the BIT....’. Also, ‘the investor is 
the one to select the different ways of solving 
controversies... at the moment he files his claim’. 
Although the contract provided that disputes arising 
under it were to be referred to the tribunals and 
courts of Quito, IBM could bring a claim under the 
BIT (even as its Ecuadorian subsidiary might pursue 
a contractual claim in domestic courts) so long as 
IBM had not itself previously initiated court 
proceedings in Ecuador. 
 
Dissenting opinion by arbitrator Aguilera declined 
to find jurisdiction over the claim on the basis that 
IBM was obliged by the contract to submit its 
claims to domestic courts. 
 
See awards dated 22 December 2003 and 22 July 
2004 (not publicly available); Investment Treaty 
News report dated 9 May 2007. 
Ecuador MCI 
Power 




Claimants are U.S. corporations that 
own and control Seacoast (also a U.S. 
company, established under the laws 
of Texas) that invested in Ecuador via 
a branch operation. The branch 
operation agreed to install and 
operate two electrical power 
generation plants and sell their power 
to the Instituto Ecuatoriano de 
Electificación (INECEL), an 
Ecuadorian state entity. 
 
Termination of contract by 
INECEL. Dismissal by a 
domestic tribunal of Seacoast’s 
claims for compensation arising 
from alleged breach of contract. 
Claim dismissed by tribunal in merits award dated 
31 July 2007. Investor had claimed violations of fair 
& equitable treatment; national treatment; and 
prohibitions on expropriation. 
 
Tribunal: Argentine national Raúl E. Vinuesa, 
presiding (appointed by ICSID after consultation 
with the parties); Canadian national Benjamin J. 
Greenberg (appointed by investor); Chilean national 
Jaime Irarrázabal C. (appointed by investor). 
Claim arose from termination of the 
contract between Seacoast and 
INECEL and alleged non-payment of 
monies owed. 
 
Other U.S. subsidiaries of the 
claimants owned Ecuadorian 
subsidiary Ecuapower. A further 
claim arose also from a subsequent 
contract between Ecuapower and 
INECEL to provide power. 
 
Claim arise because Ecuapower’s 
eventual sale of its contractual rights 
to other foreign owners was allegedly 
under disadvantageous conditions due 
to unwarranted delay in the signing of 
the contract by INECEL. 
 
Jurisdiction limited to claims arising from acts or 
omissions that occurred after entry into force of the 
treaty. Tribunal lacked jurisdiction over many of the 
alleged breaches of the treaty which arose from acts 
and omissions preceding entry into force. 
 
On the merits, tribunal rejected argument by 
Ecuador that treaty applied only to sovereign acts of 
Ecuador and not commercial acts of INECEL. 
INECEL was an organ of the state and ‘any acts or 
omissions of INECEL in breach of the BIT... are 
attributable to Ecuador’. Investor’s nevertheless 
claims rejected on basis that the failure to reach 
agreement on Seacoast’s liquidation did not arise 
from bad faith by INECEL (or Seacoast) and there 
was no basis to conclude that revocation of a permit 
in the circumstances amounted to an expropriation. 
 
Annulment proceedings ongoing. Annulment 
tribunal (all members appointed by Chair of ICSID 
Administrative Council – i.e. the President of the 
World Bank): French national Dominique Hascher, 
presiding; Swedish national Hans Danelius; 
Slovakian national Peter Tomka. 
 
See award dated 31 July 2007; ICSID website; 




2002 US-Ecuador BIT Claimant Occidental Exploration and 
Production Company (OEPC) is a 
U.S. oil firm established under 
Denial of VAT refunds to 
OEPC by the Servicio de Rentas 
Internas (SRI) after OEPC had 
previously received such refunds 
Claim resolved in favour of the investor, leading to 





California law.  
 
Dispute arose following an oil 
exploration and production contract 
with Petroecuador. The contract was 
a participation contract, which 
followed earlier services provision 
contracts. The dispute involved 
whether or not OEPC was entitled to 
Value-Added Tax (VAT) refunds, or 
whether the cost of VAT had been 
incorporated in the terms of the 
contract. 
 
from the SRI. 
 
OEPC filed four lawsuits in the 
tax courts of Ecuador objecting 
to the denial of VAT refunds by 
the SRI, which were not 
resolved at the time the tribunal 
decided OEPC’s BIT claim. 
interest. 
 
Tribunal: Chilean national Francisco Orrego-
Vicuna, presiding (appointed by agreement of co-
arbitrators); US national Charles Brower (appointed 
by investor); Ecuadorian national Patrick Barrera 
Sweeney (appointed by Ecuador). 
 
Jurisdiction found. The tribunal allowed the BIT 
claim to proceed, although it ran parallel to 
challenges brought by OEPC in domestic courts, on 
the basis that it was a separate, treaty-based claim 
rather than a contractual claim. This was important 
because the BIT contained a ‘fork in the road’ 
clause, whereby an investor was precluded under the 
treaty from submitting the same dispute both to 
domestic courts and to a BIT tribunal. 
 
In addition, the tribunal concluded that the BIT’s 
exception for tax measures did not apply to OEPC’s 
claim because ‘in part the dispute finds its origins in 
[the contract] insofar as it is disputed whether VAT 
reimbursement is included in Factor X [of the 
contract]’. This was important because the BIT’s 
exception for tax measures was did not apply to a 
dispute concerning ‘the observance and 
enforcement of terms of an investment Agreement 
or authorization’. However, the tribunal’s 
conclusion that the dispute arose from a contract 
(thus defeating the BIT’s exception for tax 
measures) contradicts its conclusion that the dispute 
arose from the treaty (thus allowing the investor’s 
claim under the BIT despite its parallel resort to 
domestic remedies and consequent breach of the 
‘fork in the road’ provision). 
 
On the merits, the tribunal found that Ecuador had 
violated the BIT by treating the investor arbitrarily; 
even though the SRI’s decision-making to deny 
VAT refunds was found by the tribunal not to be 
based on ‘prejudice or preference’ but rather on 
‘reason and fact’, nevertheless, the ‘very confusion 
and lack of clarity’ arising from the SRI’s practices 
over several years ‘resulted in some form of 
arbitrariness, even if not intended’. 
 
Further, on the merits, the tribunal interpreted the 
BIT’s most-favoured-nation obligation such that it 
was taken to remove any requirement that national 
treatment under the BIT be limited to situations in 
which two investors are ‘in like circumstances’. 
Instead, the tribunal found that national treatment 
required Ecuador to provide the same VAT 
treatment to oil ‘producers’ (such as OEPC) as it did 
to ‘exporters’ of e.g. flowers (which unlike 
‘producers’ were eligible for VAT refunds under 
Ecuadorian law). This broad reading of national 
treatment by the tribunal operated in favour of 
OEPC and investment treaty claimants in general. 
In addition, the tribunal concluded that, although 
the SRI did not intend to discriminate against 
OEPC or foreign-owned firms, the less favourable 
effects of the SRI’s decision was sufficient to violate 
national treatment. 
 
Further, on the merits, the tribunal adopted a broad 
reading of the BIT standard of fair & equitable 
treatment. Relying on earlier tribunals that adopted a 
similarly broad reading, the tribunal found that the 
obligation required Ecuador to ‘ensure a transparent 
and predictable framework for [investors’] business 
planning and investment’ and to ‘act in a consistent 
manner, free from ambiguity and totally 
transparently in its relations with the foreign 
investor’. Adding to this already broad reading, the 
tribunal concluded here that this duty of 
transparency and predictability ‘is an objective 
requirement that does not depend on whether the 
Respondent [state] has proceeded in good faith or 
not’. Thus, the good faith decisions of the SRI on 
VAT refunds led to a violation of the BIT 
obligation of fair & equitable treatment by Ecuador. 
Finally, with very little discussion and no reference 
to outside authorities, the tribunal concluded that 
this reading of fair & equitable treatment (contrary 
to what was argued by Ecuador here, and by other 
states, including the U.S. and Canada, in other 
arbitrations) ‘is not different from that required 
under [customary] international law’. 
 
Ecuador applied to UK courts for the award to be 
set aside on the basis that the tribunal exceeded its 
jurisdiction by finding that the BIT’s exception for 
tax measures did not preclude the investor’s claim. 
This argument was rejected by the UK courts and 
the award was upheld. Importantly, the UK courts 
did not review the decision of the tribunal on the 
merits of the dispute because this was beyond the 
scope of the UK courts’ authority under UK law (in 
effect implementing the New York Convention) to 
set aside an arbitration award. 
 
See award dated 1 July 2004; England & Wales High 
Court of Justice decisions dated 29 April 2005 and 2 
March 2006; England & Wales Court of Appeal 
dated 9 September 2005 and 4 July 2007. 






Claimant Encana was a Canadian 
corporation. 
 
Encana owned two Barbadian 
subsidiaries that had entered into 
contracts with the state oil company 
(PETROECUADOR) for exploration 
and exploitation of oil and gas. 
Resolutions of Ecuador’s tax 
authorities (the Servicio de 
Rentas Internas – SRI) that 
denied refunds of value added 
tax to Encana’s subsidiaries. 
 
The value of the tax credits 
denied was approximately 
(US)$80 million. 
 
The Resolutions arose out of 
complex issues of legal 
interpretation arising from a 
series of amendments to 
Ecuador’s Internal Tax Regime 
Law and its Regulations. 
 
The Resolution also arose from 
an SRI auditors’ review of VAT 
refunds granted, especially to oil 
companies. 
 
Subsequently, the SRI denied the 
availability of VAT refunds to 
the Encana subsidiaries on the 
basis that (1) VAT paid by the 
subsidiaries was already 
considered in their participation 
share at the time of contract 
negotiations and (2) VAT 
Claim dismissed mainly on basis of the BIT’s 
exception for tax measures. 
 
Tribunal: Australian national James Crawford, 
presiding (appointed by agreement of co-
arbitrators); Argentine national Horacio Grigera 
Naón (appointed by investor); Canadian national J. 
Christopher Thomas (appointed by Ecuador). 
 
On the merits, claim was dismissed because treaty 
contained tax exception in relation to all standards 
of investor protection other than protections against 
expropriation. 
 
The expropriation claim dismissed, first, on the 
basis that no issue of indirect expropriation arose 
because the tax measure was not extraordinary, 
punitive in amount, or arbitrary in its incidence. 
Second, in terms of direct expropriation: 
 
‘the executive is entitled to take a position in relation 
to claims put forward by individuals, even if that 
position may turn out to be wrong in law, provided 
it does so in good faith and stands ready to defend 
its position before the courts.... An executive agency 
does not expropriate the value represented by a 
statutory obligation to make a payment or refund by 
mere refusal to pay, provided at least that (a) the 
refusal is not merely wilful, (b) the courts are open 
to the aggrieved private party, (c) the courts’ 
refunds were available only for 
manufactured goods and not 
non-renewable resource 
extraction activities.  
 
The Encana subsidiaries (and 
other oil companies) challenged 
the Resolutions before the 
Ecuadorian District Tax Court, 
but were unsuccessful; they 
appealed to the Ecuadorian 
Supreme Court, but withdrew 
their appeals when Encana filed 
its BIT claim. 
 
A subsequent interpretation of 
the Law adopted by the 
Ecuadorian National Congress 
clarified that VAT refunds were 
not available to oil activities on 
the basis that oil is extracted and 
not manufactured. 
decisions are not themselves overridden or 
repudiated by the State.’ 
 
In the circumstances, no direct expropriation 
occurred because (a) the oil companies could and 
did challenge the SRI’s rulings in the courts, (b) 
when the SRI lost it complied promptly with the 
court decisions, (c) the SRI Director General was 
‘acting in good faith in a matter where the legal 
issues were unclear and unsettled’, and (d) there was 
no evidence that the court decisions were partisan, 
biased against the oil companies, or otherwise non-
independent. 
 
Thus, the SRI’s policy on oil refunds never 
repudiated an Ecuadorian legal right and thus did 
not amount to expropriation. On the other hand, 
the tribunal noted that its conclusion might have 
differed in the case of claims to tax refunds that 
were still pending before the Ecuadorian courts at 
the time of the National Congress’ interpretation of 
the Law. The Encana subsidiaries had withdrawn 
their challenges well before then, however. 
 
Arbitrator Naon dissented on the expropriation 
claim, concluding that there was an expropriation of 
the investor’s right to returns, ‘including the 
legitimate expectation inextricably associated with 
the notion of returns’ and that ‘an interference in 
legitimate expectations of the foreign investor... 
includes State incoherent conduct obscuring the 
national legal treatment of matters directly 
determining the foreign investor’s entitlement to 
returns covered by the Treaty’. He concluded that 
the denial of tax refunds was expropriatory because 
the investor’s return was ‘adversely affected in a 
substantial way by a measure or string of measures’.  
The measures were also discriminatory because they 
targeted the oil industry, and because they lacked a 
clear and principled public purpose. Further, the 
measures were not excused by the legislation 
interpreting the Law which ‘may succeed... in 
legitimizing such conduct within he province of the 
local legal system of such State, but does not 
necessarily have a similar effect on the international 
plane’. There was lastly no requirement for the 
foreign investor to resort to local courts once an act 
of the State led to an expropriation claim. 
 
Tribunal concluded that costs of the arbitration 
should be born fully by Ecuador. The costs, 
including arbitrator fees and expenses as well as 
institutional charges, were (US)$685,000. 
 
See awards dated 31 January 2004, 27 February 
2004, and 3 February 2006. 
Ecuador Duke 
Energy 










First claimant, Duke Energy, is a U.S. 
incorporated partnership (Delaware) 
and the sole parent company of Duke 
Energy International del Ecuador. 
 
Second claimant, Electroquil, is an 
Ecuadorian power generation 
company.  
 
Dispute arose from contracts entered 
Alleged non-payment for power 
supplied under power purchase 
agreement. 
 
Imposition of fines by INECEL 
against Electroquil for failure to 
satisfy power purchase 
agreement obligations, 
challenged by Electroquil via an 
arbitration claim before the 
Arbitration and Mediation 
Center of the Guayaquil 
Chamber of Commerce; the 
Award issued very recently against Ecuador for 
(US)$5.7 million plus interest. 
 
Tribunal: Swiss national Gabrielle Kaufmann-
Kohler, presiding (appointed by agreement of the 
parties); Columbian national Enrique Gomez-
Pinzon (appointed by investor); Dutch national 
Albert Jan van den Berg (appointed by Ecuador). 
 
Jurisdiction found under both ad hoc arbitration 
into between the claimants and 
Ecuador for electrical power 
generation in Guayaquil. Electroquil 
was the first private power generator 
established in Ecuador (in 1992). 
From 1995, the Instituto Ecuatoriano 
de Electrificacion (INECEL) entered 
into a power purchase agreements 
with Guayaquil to provide power, 
until the liberalization of electricity 
contracting and liquidation by 
legislation of INECEL in 1996 (with 
the Ministry of Mines and Energy 
assuming INECEL’s rights and 
obligations). Under the power 
purchase agreements, fuel was to be 
supplied to Guayaquil by the state 
entity Petrocomercial and paid for by 
INECEL. 
 
Duke Energy purchased Electroquil 
after purchase power contracts were 
entered into and fines levied by 
INECEL. 
tribunal dismissed the claim on 
the basis that the applicable 
arbitration clause was invalid 
under Ecuadorian law. 
 
Contractual relationships 
between Electroquil and 
Ecuadorian state entities were 
terminated. Duke Energy and 
Electroquil entered into an 
agreement with Ecuador to refer 
outstanding disputes to ICSID 
arbitration. Subsequent resort by 
claimants to BIT as basis for 
claim, alongside the arbitration 
agreement. 
agreement and BIT (with the exception of a dispute 
regarding customs duties which the tribunal held fell 
outside its jurisdiction due to the BIT’s exception 
for tax measures). 
 
On the merits, the tribunal concluded that INECEL 
breached its payment obligations arising from the 
power purchase agreements, and that some of the 
fines levied against Electroquil were not justified 
(although the tribunal found no bad faith on the 
part of Ecuador). Under the BIT, the tribunal 
concluded that these contractual breaches 
constituted in turn a breach of Ecuador’s obligation 
under the BIT’s ‘umbrella clause’ to ‘observe any 
obligation it may have entered into with respect to 
investments’. Also under the BIT, Ecuador was 
found to have violated the fair and equitable 
treatment standard because Ecuador ‘deceived Duke 
Energy’s reasonable expectations’ by not 
implementing a payment guarantee. However, the 
tribunal limited its damages award to the ‘nominal 
sum’ of approximately (US)$5.7 million plus 
interest. 
 
See ICSID website; Investment Arbitration 
Reporter report dated 3 June 2008. 
Ecuador Noble 
Energy 
2005 US-Ecuador BIT Dispute arose from regulation 
measures in Ecuador’s electricity 
sector, following privatization 
program in 1996. 
 
Claim was brought against Ecuador 
and the Consejo Nacional de 
Resolution by CONELEC in 
2003 that altered the way in 
which MachalaPower treated the 
VAT it paid on its purchase of 
natural gas for its power plant as 
a cost declaration to CENACE. 
 
Decree by the Ecuadorian 
Tribunal: Swiss national Gabrielle Kaufmann-
Kohler, presiding (appointed by agreement of 
parties); Canadian national Henri Alvarez (appointed 
by investor); Spanish national Bernardo M. 
Cremades (appointed by Ecuador). 
 
Jurisdiction found based on BIT (as well as 
investment contract). Tribunal allowed Noble 
Electricidad (CONELEC). 
 
First claimant, Noble Energy, was a 
U.S. company established in 
Delaware. This claimant brought a 
claim before the tribunal under the 
BIT and an investment contract 
between Samedan Oil Co. (a 
subsidiary of Noble Energy) and the 
Ecuadorian government that was to 
be executed together with the 
concession contract discussed below. 
  
Second claimant, indirectly owned by 
Noble Energy, was a Cayman Islands 
company. It in turn had a branch in 
Ecuador where it produces and sells 
thermoelectric power in the spot 
market and under power purchase 
agreements. This claimant brought a 
claim before the tribunal under a 
concession contract with CONELEC 
for the construction, installation, and 
operation of an electric power 
generation plant. It had commenced 






government that changed the 
mechanism for payment of 
MachalaPower’s invoices such 
that CENACE would no longer 
collect from distributors and pay 
generators for the electricity sold 
in the spot market. Instead, from 
October 2003, MachalaPower 
was required to invoice and 
collect from each distribution 
company directly. 
 
Agreements between Ecuador 
and Colombia in context of the 
Andean Community that 
allegedly enabled Colombia 
generators to export energy to 
Ecuador with preferential 
treatment. 
 
Alleged refusal of Ecuador and 
CONELEC to enforce the 
existing legal framework by their 
not assisting MachalaPower to 
collect unpaid receivables from 
its customers and by not 
allowing MachalaPower to cut 
off its dispatch of electricity. 
 
Decrees of the Ecuadorian 
government that lowered the 
price of oil bought from 
Petroecuador for certain 
government thermal power 
generators, allegedly favouring 
Energy, although it was an indirect shareholder of 
MachalaPower, to bring a claim under the BIT. It 
declined to consider Barcelona Traction other than 
to dismiss it as a diplomatic protection case that 
‘cannot be transposed in to the context of a BIT 
which protects direct and indirect investment...’, 
including ‘shares... in a company’. On whether there 
is any limit to the layers or corporations through 
which indirect ownership may be traced, the tribunal 
declined to rule on whether there should be any cut-
off point, but concluded that the two intermediate 
layers of ownership between MachalaPower and 
Noble Energy in this case was not too remote.  
 
The arbitration is ongoing on the merits. 
 
See award dated 5 March 2008; ICSID website; 
Investment Arbitration Reporter report dated 3 June 
2008. 
state-owned generators over 
MachalaPower by allowing them 
to switch to cheaper oil, whereas 
MachalaPower used natural gas 
to generate electricity. 
 
Alleged violation of national and 
MFN treatment, fair & equitable 
treatment, protection from 
expropriation, and umbrella 
clause in BIT. Also, alleged 
violation of concession contract 










Reportedly arises from an alleged 
expropriation of an electricity firm in 
2000. 
 Tribunal: Mexican national Bernardo Sepulveda 
Amor, presiding (unknown method of 
appointment); US national John H. Rooney 
(unknown whether appointed by investor or by 
Ecuador); US national Michael W. Reisman 
(unknown whether appointed by investor or by 
Ecuador). 
 
No jurisdictional award issued. 
 
See ICSID website; Investment Treaty News report 
dated 18 May 2006; Investment Arbitration 






Eurocontrol is a Spanish engineering 
and construction firm. 
 
Unknown. Discontinued before a jurisdictional award was 
issued. Reportedly settled in May 2008. Unknown 
whether tribunal constituted. 
It is unknown 
under what Rules 
the claim was 
filed. 
The dispute reportedly arose from a 
refinery expansion project. 
 
See ICSID website; Investment Treaty News Report 
dated 9 May 2007; Investment Arbitration Reporter 
report dated 3 June 2008. 





Chevron is a U.S. oil company. 
 
The dispute reportedly relates to 
longstanding domestic court disputes 
over crude oil sales. 
Unknown. Tribunal: German national Karl-Heinz Bockstiegel, 
presiding (unknown whether appointed via 
Permanent Court of Arbitration or by agreement of 
co-arbitrators); US national Charles Brower 
(presumably appointed by investor); Dutch national 
Albert Jan van den Berg (presumably appointed by 
Ecuador). 
 
No jurisdictional award yet issued. 
 








First claimant is Occidental 
Petroleum Corporation, a U.S. oil 
company. 
 
Second claimant is Occidental 
Exploration and Production 
Company. 
 
Claim under BIT as well as 
Participation Contract of 1999 
between OEPC, Ecuador, and 
Petroecuador in connection with 
exploration and exploitation of 
Caducidad Decree issued in May 
2006 by Attorney General to 
Ministry of Energy and Mines to 
terminate Participation Contract 
(and related agreements) for 
alleged violations of the 
Participation Contract, including 
alleged (1) transfer of rights and 
obligations under the 
Participation Contract to AEC (a 
Bermuda-based subsidiary of 
Canadian oil and gas company 
EnCana) without ministerial 
approval, (2) entry into a 
consortium to carry out 
exploration and exploitation 
without ministerial approval, (3) 
non-investment of minimum 
Tribunal: Canadian national Yves Fortier, presiding 
(unknown whether appointed by ICSID or by 
agreement of the parties); New Zealand national 
David A.R. Williams (presumably appointed by 
investor); French national Brigitte Stern (presumably 
appointed by Ecuador). 
 
No jurisdictional award yet issued. 
 
See award dated 17 August 2007; ICSID website; 
Investment Treaty News report dated 9 May 2007. 
hydrocarbons in ‘Block 15’ of the 
Ecuadorian Amazon. 
 
Claim stated to exceed $1 billion. 
amounts required under the 
Participation Contract, (4) 
repeated violations of the 






Tecnicas Reunidas is a Spanish 
engineering and construction firm. 
 
The dispute reportedly arose from a 
refinery expansion project. 
Unknown. Discontinued before a jurisdictional award was 
issued. Reportedly settled in May 2008. Unknown 
whether tribunal constituted. 
 
See ICSID website; Investment Treaty News report 
dated 9 May 2007; Investment Arbitration Reporter 
report dated 3 June 2008.  
Ecuador Murphy 
Oil 




Murphy is a U.S. oil company. Unknown, but see description of 
Repsol (2008). 
Tribunal not constituted. 
 
See ICSID website; Investment Arbitration 
Reporter report dated 3 June 2008. 





Perenco is a French oil company. Unknown, but see description of 
Repsol (2008). 
Tribunal not constituted. 
 
See ICSID website; Investment Arbitration 
Reporter report dated 3 June 2008. 
 




Repsol is a Spanish oil company. Ecuador sought to renegotiate 
the terms of its concession 
contracts for oil and gas 
production. It sought to raise the 
state’s share of extraordinary oil 
company profits from 50% to 
Repsol reportedly agreed in August 2008 to convert 
its current participation contracts in Ecuador into 
service provider contracts, in exchange for the 
extension of Repsol’s production concessions until 
2018. It will reportedly transfer its ICSID claim to a 
ICSID Rules. 99%. Extraordinary profits were 
those that flowed where the 
market price of oil rose above a 
benchmark price laid out in the 
concessions. An offer was later 
made by Ecuador to reduce this 
increase in the state’s share from 
99% to 70%. This offer was 
conditional on the relevant firms 
converting their ‘participation’ 
concession contracts to ‘service’ 
contracts (see below) and 
maintaining current levels of 
investment and output. It was 
also conditional on the firms 
withdrawing any claims they had 
brought before ICSID or other 
arbitration bodies, and resorting 
instead to the use of domestic 
courts to resolve disputes with 
Ecuador. 
 
Under the participation 
contracts, the state receives a 
percentage of the profits earned 
from oil production. Under the 
(proposed) new service 
contracts, the companies would 
receive a production fee and 
reimbursement for their 
investment costs. 
‘regional UN court based in Santiago, Chile’. 
 
See Dow Jones, ‘Repsol Agrees to Sign Service 
Provider Deal With Ecuador (11 August 2008); M 
Alvaro, ‘Ecuador Oil Min Makes New Offer to Cut 






2008 US-Ecuador BIT Conoco-Phillips is a U.S. oil 
company. 
Unknown, but see description of 
Repsol (2008). 
Unknown whether any awards issued. 
 
See Investment Arbitration Reporter report dated 3 
June 2008. 
 




First claimant was Chilean company 
that owned 98% of the shares of the 
second claimant, a Peruvian company, 
which owned a property in Lima 
where it had constructed an industrial 
plant for the manufacture and sale of 
pasta. The property was close to, but 
not within, a protected wetland. 
Annulment by Municipality of 
Lima in 1997-98 of the permits 
granted to second claimant for 
construction of its industrial 
plant, referring to environmental 
problems and supposed 
deficiencies in the granting of 
the permits. This annulment was 
the subject of Peruvian judicial 
proceedings in which the second 
claimant was successful. 
Claim dismissed on the basis that dispute preceded 
conclusion of BIT and was thus outside tribunal’s 
jurisdiction. 
 
Tribunal: US national Thomas Buergenthal, 
presiding (appointed by ICSID SG after 
consultation with parties); French national Jan 
Paulsson (appointed by investor), Spanish national 
Bernardo M. Cremades (appointed by Peru). 
 
Application to annul the award rejected. Annulment 
tribunal (all members appointed by Chair of ICSID 
Administrative Council – i.e. the President of the 
World Bank): Swedish national Hans Danelius, 
presiding, Italian national Andrea Giardini, and UK 
national Franklin Berman (who dissented and would 
have annulled the award).  
 
See award dated 7 February 2005; annulment 
tribunal award dated 5 September 2007. 




Claim by Tza Yap Shum, a Chinese 
national, who owns 90% of TSG 
Peru. 
 
Seeks US$20 million for alleged 
expropriation of fish flour company 
TSG Peru, which is involved in the 
manufacturing, import, export, and 
distribution of fish flour intended for 
Charge to TSG Peru by 
Superintendencia Nacional de 
Administración Tributaria 
(Sunat) for alleged tax debt of 
about US$4 million and alleged 
confiscation of TSG’s bank 
accounts. 
Unknown whether tribunal constituted. 
 
See Investment Treaty News report 2 March 2007. 
the Asian market. 
 






Inclusion of key provisions in Spain’s BITs with CAP states 
 
Key provisions Spain-Bolivia Spain-Colombia* Spain-Ecuador Spain-Peru 
provision for investor-state arbitration Yes Yes Yes Yes 
application to all acts or measures of state Yes Yes Yes  
application to all investments, incl intellectual property Yes Yes Yes  
waiver of duty to exhaust local remedies Yes, subject only to 
requirement for six 
months’ consultation. 
Yes, subject only to 
requirement for six 
months’ consultation. 
Yes, subject only to 
requirement for six 
months’ consultation. 
Yes, subject only to 
requirement for six 
months’ consultation. 
allowance for forum-shopping by investors No, except (potentially) 
via MFN clause or liberal 
interpretation of ‘seat’ by 
arbitrators. 
No, except (potentially) 
via MFN clause or liberal 
interpretation of ‘seat’ by 
arbitrators. 
No, except (potentially) 
via MFN clause or liberal 
interpretation of ‘seat’ by 
arbitrators. 
No, except (potentially) 
via MFN clause or liberal 
interpretation of ‘control’ 
by arbitrators. 
use of private arbitrators Yes Yes Yes Yes 
allocation of appointing authority ICSID, UNCITRAL ICSID, UNCITRAL ICSID, UNCITRAL ICSID, UNCITRAL 
allowance for state liability as remedy Yes Yes Yes Yes 
national treatment Yes Yes Yes Yes 
most-favoured-nation (MFN) treatment Yes Yes Yes Yes 
fair & equitable treatment. full protection & security Yes Yes Yes  Yes 
restrictions on expropriation, incl regulatory expropriation Yes Yes Yes Yes 
guarantee of free capital transfers Yes Yes Yes Yes 
specific prohibitions on performance requirements No No No No 
umbrella clause Yes Yes No No 
exceptions for local or sub-national state measures No No No No 
exceptions for specific measures Exception to national 
treatment and MFN 
treatment for 
participation in free trade 
zone, customs or 




Exception to national 
Exception to fair & 
equitable treatment and 
MFN treatment for 
participation in customs 
union or common 
market. 
 
Exception to fair & 
equitable treatment and 
MFN treatment for tax 
Exception to fair & 
equitable treatment, 
national treatment, and 
MFN treatment for 
participation in free trade 
zone, customs union, or 
common market. 
 
Exception to fair & 
equitable treatment, 
Exception to MFN 
treatment for 
participation in free trade 
zone, customs union, or 
common market. 
 
Exception to MFN 
treatment for tax treaties. 
 
treatment and MFN 
treatment for tax treaties. 
 




Exception to national 
and MFN treatment for 
measures of public order 
and security or of public 
health. 
treaties. national treatment, and 
MFN treatment for tax 
treaties. 
 
Exception to guarantee 
of free capital transfers 
for capital controls for a 
limited period to address 
exceptional of balance of 
payments difficulties. 
 
exceptions for specific sectors No No No  
duration of states’ obligations 15 + additional 15 years 
for existing investments. 
10 + additional 10 years 
for existing investments. 
 
Minimum duration is 10 
years, after which treaty 
can be denounced with 
six months’ notice. 
 
After denunciation, the 
obligations for existing 
investments continue for 
an additional 10 years. 
10 + additional 10 years 
for existing investments; 
limited window for 
denunciation. 
 
Minimum duration is 10 
years, after which the 
treaty automatically 
renews for an additional 
term of 10 years. Treaty 
can be denounced only 
during the six months 
prior to expiry at the end 
of the applicable 10 year 
term. 
 
After denunciation, the 
obligations for existing 
investments continue for 
an additional 10 years. 
10 + additional 10 years 
for existing investments; 
limited window for 
denunciation. 
 
Minimum duration is 10 
years, after which the 
treaty automatically 
renews for an additional 
term of 5 years. Treaty 
can be denounced only 
during the six months 
prior to expiry at the end 




Minimum duration is 15 
years, after which treaty 
can be denounced with 
12 months’ notice. 
 
After denunciation, the 
obligations for existing 
investments continue for 
an additional 15 years. 
After denunciation, the 
obligations for existing 
investments continue for 
an additional 10 years. 
